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I I. Introduction
A. Summary. Air Pollution can threaten the values and 
purposes of parks, and National Park Service (NPS) 
research and monitoring already reveals the reality of 
the threat. The Clean Air Act (CAA) provides many 
opportunities and some tools to protect park resources. 
The CAA, however, does not currently address several 
air pollution situations affecting park air quality and 
related values. The NPS Organic Act calls for the 
protection of park values and purposes. The Organic 
Act, however relies for enforcement of its mandate on 
regulation and trespass or nuisance actions, which may 
not be available where air polluting activities on 
lands outside park boundaries are threatening park 
values and purposes. Other laws that may provide 
opportunities for park protection against air pollution 
in special circumstances (e .g . . the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act) are not specifically 
discussed herein.
B. References. Detailed references are cited throughout 
the outline.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the position of the National Park Service 
or the Department of the Interior.
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II. Examples of Air Pollution Affecting Units of the National 
Park System
A. Effects. Air pollution can damage and destroy the very 
resources and values that the parks were created to 
protect and preserve.
1. Ambient Air Quality. NPS monitoring reveals ozone 
concentrations approaching or exceeding the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) in 
several park units, including remote "rural" parks 
as well as parks closer to urban areas. Sulfur 
dioxide concentrations, although below the NAAQS, 
are unexpectedly high in certain units. "Known 
Ambient Air Quality in National Parks," May 1985, 
NPS document prepared for hearings before the 
Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of 
the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, May 20-21, 1985. Manmade visibility 
impairment, caused primarily by sulfates in most 
areas, affects all park units in the lower 48 
United States virtually all the time. Letter from 
Susan Recce to Charles L. Elkins, November 14, 
19 8 5; Impacts of Air Pollution on National Park 
Units: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National
Parks and Recreation of the House Comm, on Interior
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1st Ses s .and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 
(hereinafter "May 1985 Congressional Hearings on 
Park Air Quality"), at 539-548 ("Known Visibility 
Effects in National Park Units, May 1985").
2. Vegetation Resources. NPS research has found 
visible ozone injury on vegetation in over 75 
percent of the 44 park units studied, including 
units where the current ozone NAAQS has not been 
exceeded. In certain units, many of the sampled 
trees of a sensitive species show ozone injury. 
NPS research on quaking aspen suggests that 
elevated ozone concentrations in certain park units 
may have already brought about the elimination of 
sensitive genotypes. Letter from John P. 
Christiano to David McKee, June 25, 1986; May 1985 
Congressional Hearings on Park Air Quality, supra, 
at 535-538 ("Known Air Pollution Effects on 
Vegetation in National Parks, May 1985"). NPS 
research has also discovered elevated levels of 
toxic trace elements in park vegetation, and 
significant decreases in lichen abundance and 
diversity in a few areas probably from sulfur 
dioxide pollution. Id.
3. Visibility Resources. In excess of 90 percent of
3
the time, s c e n i c  v i e w s  are a f f e c t e d  by 
anthropogenic pollution in the form of regional 
haze at all NPS monitoring stations. In addition, 
in ten mandatory class I park units, NPS has 
identified specific visibility impairment that is 
suspected of being reasonably attributable to 
certain identified sources. Letter from Susan 
Recce to Charles L. Elkins, supra; Letter from 
Bruce Blanchard to EPA Docket Number A-85-26, March 
24, 1986; Mav 1985 Congressional Hearings on Park 
Air Quality, supra, at 539-548. Sulfates are the 
single most important contributor to visibility 
impairment in park units except in the northwestern 
United States, where fine carbon plays a more 
prominent ro]e. For example, sulfates are 
responsible for 40-60 percent of the visibility 
impairment in the Colorado Plateau parks, and for 
over 70 percent of the impairment in Shenandoah 
National Park. As for general visibility trends, 
National Weather Service data shows that summertime 
visibility over much of the eastern United States 
has decreased since 1948 more than fifty percent to 
a current visual range of Jess than 25 kilometers. 
In the Great Smoky Mountains, median summer 
visibility is less than 10 kilometers. A] though 
visibility in California's uiban and industrial
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centers has improved since 1967-1968, visibility in 
California's pristine areas has decreased from 1959 
to 1976. May 1985 Congressional Hearings on Park 
Air Quality, supra, at 539-548; Joseph, David, 
"Pollution Where You'd Least Expect It," EPA 
Journal (March 1986); "Developing Long-Term 
Strategies for Regional Haze: Findings and
Recommendations of the Visibility Task Force," U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (1985); "Patterns 
and Trends in Data for Atmospheric Sulfates and 
Visibility," Acid Deposition: Long-Term Trends
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986),
at 109-127.
4. Aquatic Resources. The National Academy of 
Sciences this year attested to the existence of a 
cause-effect relationship between sulfur dioxide 
emissions and sulfates found in certain lakes and 
streams. See, generally. Acid Deposition: Long-
Term Trends, supra. NPS research has documented 
the vulnerability to acidification of many park 
lakes and streams, with the subsequent threatened 
loss of biological species dependent on the 
potentially affected aquatic resources. "Pollution 
in Parks," 6 Park Science Special Supplement 
(Summer, 1986), at 10-13; Mav 1985 Congressional
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Hearings on Park Air Quality, supra, at 46-50, 55- 
56, 241-54. The NPS has also documented instances 
of temporary increases in the acidity of park lakes 
and streams following acid rain events. Mav 1985 
Congressional Hearings on Park Air Quality, supra, 
at 552-53 ("Known Air Pollution Effects on Aquatic 
Systems in National Park Units, May 1985"). 
Finally, research in Shenandoah National Park has 
now confirmed that a monitored stream, predicted 
for near-term acidification based on the limited 
sulfate absorption capacity of its associated 
soils, has recently acidified, becoming five times 
more acidic over a six-year period. "Pollution in 
Parks," s u p r a , at Supplement 12-13; Mav 1985 
Congressional Hearings on Park Air Quality, supra; 
Presentation by Dr. James Galloway, Meeting of the 
Joint Committee on Acid Rain, Virginia General 
Assembly, Shenandoah National Park, August 28, 
1985.
5. C ultural R e s o u r c e s . The research strongly 
indicates that bronze, marble, limestone, and 
certain sandstones deteriorate at a much faster 
rate in the presence of sulfur dioxide in the air 
and acidity in precipitation. Many culture] 
resources in the National Park System are thus
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susceptible to the effects of air pollution. For 
example, in the northeastern United States alone, 
there are approximately 50,000 historic stone 
buildings, 12,000 of which are particularly 
susceptible to acid rain damage. Nationwide, there 
are approximately 20,000 historic monuments, about 
half of which are bronze. See. generally# Report 
of Materials Effects Task Group, 1985 National Acid 
Precipitation Assessment Program Annual Report (in 
print). The research also indicates that airborne 
particulates promote deterioration of marble and 
bronze statues. M. Del Monte, C. Sabbioni, 0. 
Victori, "Airborne Carbon Particles and Marble 
Deterioration," 15 Atmos. Environ. 645 (1980)
B. Sources. The air pollution that affects parks can come 
from large individual sources or, cumulatively, from 
many small or regional sources. It can originate as 
emissions from nearby or far-distant sources or 
anywhere in-between.
1. NPS modeling and trajectory analysis is being 
applied to locate the source regions, and sometimes 
the specific sources, emitting the pollution that 
impacts parks. The NPS employs state-of-the art 
approaches to these source-receptor problems. See,
7
generally. letter from Susan Recce to Charles L. 
Elkins, supra; Mav 1985 Congressional Hearings on 
Park Air Quality, supra. at 147,155; Henderson, D., 
et al. , "Long-Distance Transport of Man-made Air 
Pollutants," 5 Park Science 6 (Winter 1985); 
Henderson, D., "Regional Sulfur and Oxidant 
Modeling," 6 Park Science Special Supplement 8 
(Summer 1986); Bresch, J.F., et al., "Origins of 
S u l f u r - L a d e n  Air at National Parks in the 
Continental United States," presented at the Air 
Pollution Control Association Specialty Conference 
on "Visibility Protection; Research and Policy 
Aspects," Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming, 
September 7-10, 1986.
2. The following are examples of source-receptor 
relationships documented by NPS research;
a. Back-trajectory residence time analyses have 
been performed to determine sources and 
pathways of polluted air impacting six parks in 
the C o l o r a d o  Plateau region as well as 
Theodore Roosevelt, Big Bend, and Glacier 
National Parks. See, e.g.. Malm, William C., 
et al., "Origins of Atmospheric Sulfur at Chaco 
Culture National Historic Park," Proceedings of
8
t h e_S y m p o s i u m  on A i r  P o l l u t i o n  E f f e c t s  on P a r k s
and Wilderness Areas, Mesa Verde National Park, 
Colorado, May 20-23, 1984; Bresch, J.F., et 
al. , "Origins of Sulfur-Laden Air at National 
Parks in the Continental United States," supra. 
Such analyses reveal, for example, that on the 
worst visibility days in the Grand Canyon, the 
dirty air masses come from southern California 
or the smelter regions of Texas, Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Mexico. Ashbaugh, L.L., Malm, W. 
and W. Sadeh, "A Residence Time Probability 
Analysis of Sulfur Concentrations at Grand 
Canyon National Park, 19 Atmos. Environ. 1263 
(1985).
b. The NPS has recently begun to apply a technique 
called "principal component analysis" to 
identify more precisely the source regions and 
particular facilities emitting the pollutants 
that impact parks. Johnson, C. and W. Malm, 
"Identifying Visibility-Reducing Pollution 
Sources Using Principal Component Analysis," 
presented at the Air Pollution Control 
Association Specialty Conference on "Visibility 
Protection: Research and Policy Aspects,"
Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming, September
9
7-10, 1986.
c. Predictive dispersion modeling using a long- 
range transport model has been applied with 
very good results to eastern parks and in the 
Northern Great Plains area, and is currently 
being prepared for application in central 
California. S e e , e , g . Henderson, Donald, 
"Regional Sulfur and Oxidant Modeling," supra: 
Henderson, D., et al., "Long-Distance Transport 
of Man-Made Air Pollutants," supra. Such 
modeling shows, for example, that during 
certain elevated sulfate and ozone episodes in 
Shenandoah and Acadia National Parks, most of 
the air pollution originated outside Virginia 
and Maine, respectively. Under different 
meteorological conditions, however, local 
sources made significant contributions to 
pollution episodes, particularly at Shenandoah, 
Mammoth Cave, and Great Smoky Mountains 
National Parks. See, e.g., "Eastern National 
Parks Modeling Study," May 1985, NPS document 
prepared for hearings before Subcomm. on 
National Parks and Recreation of the House 
Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, May 20- 
21 , 1 985 ; Stewart, Douglas A., e_t al. ,
10
" M o d e l i n g  R e g i o n a l  A i r  P o l l u t i o n  I m p a c t s  f r o m
Multiple Sources," Proceedings of the Symposium 
on Air Pollution Effects on Parks and 
Wilderness Areas. Mesa Verde National Park, 
Colorado, May 20-23, 1984.
d. NPS is developing and applying a mesoscale 
model for the types of complex terrain often 
characteristic of parks. This model is 
e s p e c i a l l y  u s e f u l  for evaluating the 
contribution of local sources of air pollution 
under varying topographical and meteorological 
conditions. Henderson, D., 6 Park Science, 
supra: Arritt, R.W., et aj., "Numerical Studies 
of T h e r m a l l y  and M e c h a n i c a l l y  Forced 
Circulations over Complex Terrain," presented 
at the 79th Annual Meeting of the Air Pollution 
Control Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
June 22-27, 1986; Henderson, D., et al., "Long 
Distance Transport of Man-made Air Pollutants," 
5 Park Science 6 (Winter 1985).
III. Legal Responsibilities and Opportunities for Protection of 
Park Air Quality and Related Values
A. "By and large, air pollution which adversely affects
11
NPS units has its source outside those units and, 
therefore, outside the area of DOI's general park 
regulatory jurisdiction. Accordingly, the authority of 
the Secretary of the Interior to address the harmful 
effects of air pollution within NPS units largely 
depends upon the extent to which existing law empowers 
the Secretary to regulate, control or otherwise affect 
air polluting activities outside NPS units which create 
those harmful effects within them." Memorandum from 
Associate Solicitor to Director, National Park Service 
on "Protection of National Park System Units from the 
Adverse Effects of Air Pollution," September 20, 1985 
(hereinafter referred to as "Solicitor's Office 
Memorandum, 1985"), reprinted in Mav 1985 Congressional 
Hearings on Park Air Quality, supra, at 371-401.
B. The Clean Air Act and the National Park Service Organic 
Act constitute "the basis for the National Park 
Service's general policy of promoting and pursuing 
measures to safeguard the resources and values of park 
units from the adverse impacts of air pollution." 
Ross, Molly, "The Clean Air Act and National Parks," 6 
Park Science Special Supplement 4 (Summer 1986) .
IV. The, Clean...Air Act. The Clean Air Act (CAA) , 42 U.S.C.
7401, et se_q., provides the clearest grant of authority to
12
protect parks from the harmful effects of air pollution.
"Solicitor's Office Memorandum, 1985," supra.
A. CAA Goa l s . A basic goal of the CAA is safe and
acceptable ambient air quality--
1. Nationwide, through the attainment and maintenance 
of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
to protect public health (primary NAAQS) and 
welfare (secondary NAAQS) (id. 7409 (NAAQS), 7408 
(air quality criteria), 7602 (h) (broad definition 
of "welfare"));
2. In "clean air areas," through the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions (id. 
7470-7479) plus, in special clean air areas, the 
Protection of Visibility provisions (id.. 7491);
3. In "dirty air (nonattainment) areas," through the 
nonattainment provisions (id. 7501-7508), including 
the Emissions Offset Policy (40 C.F.R. Part 51, 
App. S).
B. CAA Measures. In pursuit of these goals, the CAA 
imposes various performance and emission restrictions 
on individual sources. See, e.g ., id. 7 410(a)(2)(B)
13
(implementation plan requirements), 7411 (New Source 
Performance Standards), 7475 and 7479 (Best Available 
Control Technology), 7491 (Best Available Retrofit 
Technology).
C. CAA Means. To implement the various measures, the CAA 
relies on State Implementation Plans (SIP's), or 
substitute plans promulgated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). Id. 7410, 7471, 7502.
D. Opportunities for Park Protection. Although the CAA
gives the Federal Land Manager authority to require 
protection of park values only in limited circumstances 
( i ci . 7475 (d) (2) (C) (iii) ; s e e , a l s o , id.. 7410
(a)(2)(H)(ii)), the CAA provides many opportunities--
e . g . , through requirements for public comment, public 
hearings, and consultations with affected Federal Land
Managers-- to influence CAA actions toward the
objective of park protection. See, e.g., id. 7408 and 
7409 (establishment of NAAQS), 7410 (adoption of 
SIP's), 7421 (consultation requirements), 7474 
( r e d e s i g n a t i o n ) ,  7 4 7 5  (PSD p e r m i t s ) ,  7476 
(establishment of increments or equivalents for 
pollutants other than sulfur dioxide and particulate 
m a t t e r ) ,  7491 (visib i l i t y  p r o t e c t i o n ) ,  7503 
(nonattainment permits).
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E. Focus on PSD. The PSD title, Part C of the CAA (id. 
7470—7491), is an important authority for park resource 
protection. See, e .q . , id. 7 470 ( 2) (purpose "to 
preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality in 
national parks,...[and other units of the National Park 
System]"). PSD addresses resource protection through 
the establishment of ceilings on additional amounts of 
air pollution over baseline levels in clean air areas, 
the protection of the air quality related values of 
certain special areas, and additional protection for 
the visibility value of certain special areas. Ross, 
"The Clean Air Act and National Parks," supra; see, 
also, Ross, Molly N., "The Sky Has No Limits: Air
Pollution and Biosphere Reserves," Proceedings of the 
Conference on the Management of Biosphere Reserves, 
Great Smoky Mountains National Park Biosphere Reserve, 
Gatlinburg, Tennessee, November 27-29, 1984.
1. Protection for Class I Areas. Within the "clean 
air regions" of the country, "class I" areas 
receive the highest degree of air quality 
protection. Forty-eight areas within the National 
Park System are designated class I.
a. Designation of Class I Areas. The CAA
1 5
designated 158 areas "class I," including 
national parks over 6,000 acres and national 
wilderness areas over 5,000 acres, in existence 
on August 7, 1977. Id.. 7 4 7 2 (a). These
" m a n d a t o r y "  class I areas may not be 
r e d e s i g n a t e d  to a l e s s  p r o t e c t i v e  
classification. Id.. 7474 (a). States and
Indian governing bodies may redesignate class 
II (and class III areas) to "class I." Id. 
7474.
b. Class I I n c r e m e n t . Once "baseline" is 
triggered by submission of the first permit 
application from a "majoi emitting facility," 
Part C allows only the smallest "increment" of
certain pollutants-- to date, cr, ] \ jiu’fin
dioxide and particulate matter-- to be added to
the air. I_d. 7473, 7479(4) (definition o£ 
"baseline concentration"), 7479(1)(definition 
of "major emitting facility"). The "adverse 
impact test," discussed below, qualifies the 
application of the class I increment ceilings.
c* Adverse Impact T e s t . In addition to the 
increment ceiling, Part C establishes a site- 
specific resource test, known as the "adverse
16
impact test," to determine whether emissions 
from the new source will have an "adverse 
impact" on the "air quality related values" 
(AQRV's) of the class I area, as follows:
o If the Federal Land Manager (id. 7602 (i)) 
determines, and satisfies the permitting 
authority, that the new source will 
adversely impact the class I area's AQRV's
-- even though the new source's emissions
will not contribute to an increment
violation-- a PSD permit shall not be
issued.
0 If the Federal Land Manager certifies that 
the new source will not adversely impact the
class I area's AQRV's-- even though the new
source's emissions will contribute to an
increment v i o l a t i o n-- the permitting
authority may issue a PSD permit. Id. 
7475(d)(2)(c).
The " a d v e r s e  impact test" imposes an 
"affirmative responsibility" on the Federal 
Land Manager to protect the AQRV's of the class
1 areas (id. 7475(d)(2)(B)) and, n[i]n the case
17
of doubt,... [to] err on the side of protecting 
the...[AQRV's] for future generations." S. 
Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 
(1977). "AQRV's" include all values of an area 
dependent upon and affected by air quality, 
such as scenic, cultural, biological, and 
recreational resources, as well as visibility 
itself. Id..; see, also, 42 Fed. Reg. 57,481 
(1977), and 43 Fed. Reg. 15,016 (April 10,
1978). The current working definition of 
"adverse impact" is any impact that--
o Diminishes the area's national significance, 
and/or
o Impairs the structure and functioning of 
ecosystems, and/or
o I m p a i r s  the q u a l i t y  of the visitor 
experience. See, e.g.. "Permit Application 
Guidance for New Air Pollution Sources," 
Natural Resources Report Series No. 85-2, 
National Park Service (August, 1985); 47 
Fed. Reg. 30,222 (July 12, 1982); 47 Fed. 
Reg. 41,480 (Sept. 20, 1982).
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d - Visibility Protection. The "national goal" of 
Park C's visibility protection program is 
"prevention of an^ future, and remedying of any 
existing, impairment of visibility in mandatory 
class I federal areas which impairment results 
from manmade air pollution." 42 U.S.C. 
7491(a). EPA is still developing parts of the 
regulatory program required to assure
•>
"reasonable progress" toward the national 
visibility goal. Id. 7491; 40 C.F.R. 51.300, 
et seg. To date, EPA's regulatory program 
addresses "plume blight" and other visibility 
impairment "reasonably attributable" to a 
specific source or sources. See 45 Fed. Reg. 
80,084 (December 2, 1980) (codified at 40
C.F.R. 51.300, et seg.) . In accordance with a 
court settlement in Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Gorsuch> No. C82-6850 RPA (N.D. Cal., filed 
1982, settled 1984, settlement amended 1986), 
EPA last year issued regulations implementing 
the new source review arid visibility monitoring 
requirements (50 Fed. Reg. 28,544 (July 12, 
1985)). Over the next few years, EPA must 
issue regulations concerning "best available 
retrofit technology" for major existing sources 
that impair visibility in mandatory class I
19
areas as well as "long-term (10-15 year) 
strategies" for moving toward the national 
visibility goal. See 49 Fed. Reg. 20,647 (May 
16, 1984) (N.B. settlement agreement amended,
1986). EPA need not issue regulations 
implementing the 1980 regulatory requirements 
for c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of "integral vistas" 
associated with mandatory class I areas, since 
the Federal Land Managers last year declined 
E P A 1 s regulatory invitation to finalize 
rulemaking identifying these resources for 
incorporation in SIP's. See 45 Fed. Reg. 
80,084 (Dec. 2 , 1980) (codified in 40 C.F.R. 
51.300 , et seq. ; 46 Fed. Rea. 3646 (Jan 15, 
1981); Letter from Susan Recce to Charles L. 
Elkins, November 14, 1985? Memorandum from
Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife and 
Parks, to Director, National Park Service, 
dated October 25, 1985, concerning "Integral 
Vistas"? Memorandum from Director to Regional 
Directors, dated October 24, 1985, concerning 
"Integral Vistas." "Integral vistas" ere views 
from inside a mandatory class I area looking 
outward to specific important panoramas or 
landmarks beyond the class I area's boundaries, 
which views have scenic, scientific, or
2 0
culturci] importance to the class I ares. 40
C.F.R. 51.301(n) ; 46 Fed. Rea. 3646 (Jan. 15, 
1981) ; "Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis of 
Listing Integral Vistas," National Park Service 
(April 1985) .
e. Summary of Protection for Class I Areas. The 
CAA "...creates several opportunities and tools 
for protecting the resources and values of 
class I areas. New pollution after baseline in 
class I areas is generally limited to the small 
class I increment, the Federal Land Manager 
must determine whether major new sources will 
adversely impact the areas, and measures must 
be developed to protect the visibility of class 
I areas from manmade pollution impairment. The 
States must develop their PSD plans with 
Federal Land Manager consultation and a public 
hearing. Major new sources must undergo an 
equally public permit review, involving air 
quality monitoring; analysis of resource 
impacts; application of 'best available control 
technology'; and effective emission ceilings 
based on the class I increment, national 
ambient standards, adverse impacts threshold, 
or possibly visibility impairment threshold,
21
whichever is the lowest. Existing sources may 
be regulated to protect visibility or to remedy 
a violation of an increment, national ambient 
standard, or a r g u a b l y  class I resource 
protection." Ross, "The Clean Air Act and 
National Parks," supra, at 5.
2. Protection for Class II Areas. The CAA designates 
as "class II" a]J "clean air regions" of the 
country not designated class I. 42 U.S.C. 7472
(b). Of the 337 units of the National Park System, 
over 289 units are class II. For example, the 
national park areas established in Alaska in 1980 
are class II. See Solicitor's Office Memorandum, 
1985 , supra: Mav 1985 Congressional Hearings on 
Park Air Quality, supra, at 113-114.
a. Redesignation of Class II Areas. A State (or 
Indian governing body, where appropriate) may 
redesignate any area within its jurisdiction to 
cJass I. In 1980 , the Federal Land Manager 
found that 44 of the 95 national monuments, 
primitive areas, and preserves studied pursuant 
to the CAA (id. 7474 (d)) possessed AQRV's as
important attributes and merited consideration 
for redesignation to class I. 45 Fed. Reg..
22
4 3 , 0 0 2  ( J u n e  25 ,  1 9 8 0 ) ;  S e e  K e r r - M c G e e  C h e m i c a l
Corp. v. Dept, of the Interior, 19 ERC 1372 
(9th Ci r . , 1983). The CAA prohibits
redesignating to the less protective "class 
III" designation certain so-called "class II 
floor areas" (also known as "mandatory class II 
areas"), including many units of the National 
Park System. 42 U.S.C. 7474(a).
b. Protective Measures. The class II increment 
ceilings on additional pollution over baseline 
concentrations (to date, only sulfur dioxide 
and particulate matter, but see id. 7476) allow 
moderate development in class II areas. For 
class II areas, the CAA dees not establish a 
site-specific resource test to ensure that a 
new source wiil not adversely affect a park or 
other special conservation unit., a variance 
from the class II increment to provide relief 
to a nonoffensive source, or a notification 
process to alert the Federal land Manager to a 
permit application from a source with the 
potential to impact a class II area. Whatever 
additional protection might be desirable for 
class II park areas must be sought through 
persuasion in CAA proceedings or through
23
provisions in other laws, if available. See, 
e . g . » the NPS Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. 1, et 
s e g .: the S u r f a c e  Mining C ontrol and
Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1201, et seg.; 
"Solicitor's Office Memorandum, 1985," supra: 
Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Division 
of Energy and Resources, to A s s i s t a n t  
Secretaries for Fish and Wildlife and Parks and 
for Land and Minerals Management, May 15, 1986 
(hereinafter referred to as "Solicitor's Office 
Memorandum, 1986").
3. Class III Areas. Redesignation of "clean air 
regions" to class III could allow for substantial 
air p o l l u t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  over b a s e l i n e
concentrations, subject-- as with all increments--
to NAAQS ceilings. 42 U.S.C. 7473. The 
redesignation process itself (id.. 7474(b)), as well 
as subsequent new source reviews (id. 7475), 
provide opportunities to argue for protection of 
park values.
F« Nonattainment Areas. As a general matter, the CAA does 
not e s t a b l i s h  an expl i c i t  role (other than
consultation-- see id. 74?]; 40 C.F.R. 51.240, et seg.)
for the Federal Land Manager of park units that are in,
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or affected by, the "dirty air (nonattainment) areas" 
of the country. One limited exception provides for new 
source review for a major source proposing to locate in 
a nonattainment area in one of the 36 States covered by 
E P A 1s visibility r egulations ( see 40 C.F.R. 
51.300(b)(2)), if the new source might impact the 
visibility of a mandatory class I area. 40 C.F.R. 
51.307, 52.28. Nevertheless, the nonattainment
provisions in Part D of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 750], et 
s e g .. provide opportunities to argue for park 
protection in various public proceedings. For example, 
the State must hold a public hearing prior to 
promulgating a nonattainment implementation plan, which 
is a plan for attaining all national ambient air 
quality standards "as expeditiously as practicable," 
most primary standards by 1982, and primary standards 
for ozone and carbon monoxide by 1987. The 
nonattainment plan must demonstrate "reasonable further 
progress" toward the national ambient standards in the 
interim; provide for reasonably available control 
technology on sources in the area; analyze effects on 
air quality, welfare, health, society, and economics; 
and require a public hearing prior to issuing a permit, 
for a new source. Id. 7502, 7501, 7504. To obtain a 
permit, new sources in urban areas must secure from 
other facijities "emission offsets" greater than the
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new source's proposed emissions; in addition, a new 
source's contio! technology must comply with the 
"lowest achievable emission rate" for such a source. 
Id. 7503.
G. As currently interpreted or implemented, the CAA does 
not address several park resource protection concerns, 
such as the following--
c The individual and cumulative impacts of sources not 
subject to PSD permit requirements, such as "minor" 
sources, most sources located in nonattainment 
areas, existing sources, and sources located in 
foreign countries;
o Regional loading of pollutants, characteristic of 
regional bane, ozone, and acid deposition;
o L o n g - r a n g e  t r a n s p o r t  of p o l l u t a n t s ,  also 
characteristic of regional haze, ozone, and acid 
deposition.
See, generally. Joseph, David B. and Molly N. Ross, 
"Visibility Programs and Regulatory Issues within the 
National Park Service," presented at the 78th Annual 
Meeting of the Air Pollution Control Assoc;i ati oi f
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D e t r o i t ,  M i c h i g a n ,  J u n e  1 6 - 2 1 ,  1 9 8 5 ;  R o s s , " T h e  C l e a n
Air Act and National Parks," supra at 5; Solicitor' s 
Office Memorandum, 1985, supra ct 6, 8; Memorandum from 
American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, 
to House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
concerning "Comments on Department of the Interior 
Memorandum of September 20, 1985 Entitled 'Protection 
of National Park System Units from the Adverse Effects 
of Air Pollution,'" November 19, 1985 (hereinafter 
referred to as "CRS Opinion, 1985"), reprinted in Mav 
1985 Congressional Hearings on Park Air Quality, supra, 
at 560-586.
National Park Service Organic Act. In strong terms, the 
NPS Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. 3, et sea. , mandates that the 
values and purposes of all units of the National Park 
System be conserved unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations. See, especially, id. 1, la-1, lc. At tl:j s> 
time, however, the enforceability of this mandate is 
unclear with respect to air polluting activities outside 
parks that affect park air quality and related values.
A. A Strong Mandate. In the 1916 statute creating the 
National Park Service, Congress declared that the 
"fundamental purpose" of units of the National Park
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System is
"to conserve the scenery end the natural and 
historic objects and the wild life therein and 
to provide foi the enjoyment of the same in 
such manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations." Id. 1.
In 1970, Congress amended the Organic Act to underscore 
that
"individually and co]Jectively, these [park] 
areas derive increased national dignity and 
recognition of their superb environmental 
quality through their inclusion jointly with 
each other in one national park system 
preserved and managed for the benefit and 
inspiration of a] 1 the people of the United 
States..." IdL. la-1.
In the most recent amendment to the Organic Act,
"Congress r e a f f i r m e d ] ,  declare[d], and 
direct[ed] that the promotion and regulation of 
the various areas of the N a t i o n a l  park
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System... shall be consistent with and founded 
in the [fundamental] purpose [of the 1916 
act]...to the common benefit of all the people 
of the United States. The authorization of 
activities shall be construed and the 
protection, management, and administration of 
these areas shall be conducted in light of the 
high public value and integrity of the National 
Park System and shall not be exercised in 
derogation of the values and purposes for which 
these various areas have been established, 
except as may have been or shall be directly 
and specifically provided by Congress." Id..
The legislative history of the above statutes 
reinforces the strong protection mandate of the Organic 
Act's plain language, as illustrated in the following 
passages:
"The Secretary has an absolute duty, which is 
not to be compromised, tc fulfill the mandate 
of the 1916 Act to take whatever action and 
seek whatever relief as will safeguaid the 
units of the National Park System." S. Pep. 
No. 528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1978).
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"The Secretary is to afford the highest 
standard of protection and care to the natural 
resources within...the National Park System. 
No decision shall compromise these resource 
values except as Congress may have specifically 
provided." Id. at 14.
See, also. National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, Civil Action 
No. 84-1348 (D.D.C., Feb. 24, 1986); Sierra Club v.
Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980).
B. Extraterritorial Applicability. There is general 
consensus that protection of park values and purposes 
can require regulation of external activities that may 
adversely affect these values and purposes. See, 
generally. Memorandum form Under Secretsiy to Assistant 
Secretaries for Fish and Wildlife and Parks and for 
Land and Minerals Management, May 28, 1986 ; "CRS
Opinion, 1985"; "Solicitor's Office Memorandum, 1985"; 
"Solicitor's Office Memorandum, 1986"; Sierra Club v. 
Andrus, supra. The Organic Act, however, does not 
provide an explicit mechanism to enforce park 
protection extraterritorially. Citing the strong 
protection mandate of the Organic Act, the Federal 
Government has used regulation as well as trespass or 
nuisance actions against activities on private or State
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l a n d s  t h a t  t h r e a t e n e d  p a r k  v a l u e s  a n d  p u r p o s e s .
C. Regulation. The Organic Act charges the Secretary of 
the Interior to "make and publish such rules and 
regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the 
use and management" of the units of the National Park 
System. 16 U.S.C. 3, la-1, lc. The case law supports 
the constitutionality, typically under the Property 
Clause (U.S. Const, art. IV, sec. 3), of regulations 
that address activities on private or State lands if 
they are necessary to protect the property of the 
United States oi the designated purposes of such 
property. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 
U.S. 518 (1897); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 
(1927); Kleooe v. hew Mexico. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
Thus, the courts have upheld laws and regulations that 
restrict activities on non-Federal land within parks, 
wilderness areas, other conservation units. See, e.g ,. 
United States v. Brown, 552 F.2nd 817 (8th Cir. 1977), 
cert, denied. 431 U.S. 949 (1977); Minnesota v. Block, 
660 F.2nd 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 
1007; Shepard, Blake, "The Scope of Congress' 
Constitutional Power under the Property Clause: 
Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the Purposes 
of National Parks and Wilderness Areas," 11 
Environmental Affairs 479 (1984). Although dicta in
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certain court opinions suggest that Congress has the 
constitutional power to authorize regulation of private 
activity beyond park boundaries to protect perk values 
and purposes, and the language of the Organic Act (16 
U . S . C .  3) c a n  be r e a d  b r o a d l y  to a p p l y  
extraterritorially, it is unclear whether the judiciary 
would uphold such extraterritorial regulation without 
additional statutory authorization.
D. Trespass and Nuisance Actions. The Federal Government 
has brought trespass and nuisance actions to protect 
parks from adverse activities on non-Federal lands. 
See United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co.# 47 8 F. 
Supp. 1215 (1979) (an air pollution case); United
States v . County Board of A rlington County, 487 F. 
Supp. 137 (1979); see, also. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 
s u p r a  ( " . . . [  I ] n t h e  e v e n t  of a real and 
immediate...threat to the scenic, natural, historic or 
biotic resource values..., the Secretary must take 
appropriate act ions ...[ wh j ch ] may incl ude.. .bringing 
trespass or nuisance actions if appropriate") . The 
legislative history of the 1978 amendment to the 
Organic Act supports such litigation, as follows:
"This restatement of these highest principles
of management is also intended to serve as the
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basis for any judicial resolution of competing 
private and public values and interests in the 
areas surrounding... areas of the National Park 
System." S. Rep. No. 528, supra at 8.
Not only are trespass and nuisance fictions cumbersome 
and perhaps untimely (see "Solicitor's Office 
Memorandum, 1985," at 23), however, but also and
" [m]ore importantly, there currently is 
substantial doubt as to the availability of 
these remedies in this context because Congress
las add r ( i i ed a :i j on a j j t y protect j c n n NPC 
units-~as elsewhere--compr ehensively in the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) and the regulatory scheme 
mandated therein."
Id.; "CRS Opinion, 1985," at 21-27.
E. Pre-emption of Trespass and Nuisance Actions. The 
Supreme Court's decision concerning the Clean Water 
Act's pre-emption of Federal common law nuisance in 
Illinois v. City of F i ] w n u k e e, 451 U.S. 304 (1981),
suggests that the CAA might similarly pre-empt Federal 
common law trespass and nuisance actions to protect 
park values and purposes. See "Solicitor's Office
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Memorandum, 1985"; "CRS Opinion, 1985" (CRS suggests 
that State common law actions may still he i va:1 ah] e; 
see, also, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 776
F.2d. 55 (2nd Cir. 1985), cert, granted, __  U.S._
(1985)). The courts have not ruled on this question 
yet, however, in situations not covered by the CAA 
where parks are indeed threatened. See, e.g., section 
IV.G. of this outline, s u p r a ; s e e , generally, 
Bleiweiss, Shell J., "Environmental Regulation and the 
Federal Common Law of Nuisance: A p]oposed Standard of
Preemption," 7 Harvard Environmental Law Review 41
(1983). If presented with this question, the courts 
will probably have to review the following types of 
issues:
1. The post-CAA "reaffirm[ation] " of the "fundamental 
purpose" of the Organic Act, along with strong 
language on the "protection of "values and purposes" 
contained in the 197 8 Amendment to the Organic Act, 
16 U.S.C. la-1. As already noted, the legislative 
history of this language recognizes the need, as 
appropriate, for "judicial resolution of competing 
private and public values and interests..." S. Rep. 
528, supra at 8.
2. The general legal presumption against repeals by
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implication, especially when later legislation 
reaffirms the earlier statutory language.
3. The stronger savings clauses of the CAA than the 
Clean Water Act. See 42 U.S.C. 7;610, 7604(e).
Sumriary and Conclusion
A. Air pollution can damage and destroy the very resources 
and values that the parks were created to protect and 
preserve. NPS monitoring reveals air pollution 
concentrations of concern in various park units. NPS 
research has documented air pollution effects of 
concern or. pail vegetal i on, visibility, streams and 
lakes, and cultural resources. NPS research on the 
sources of air pollution impacting park units reveal 
with increasing s p e c i f i c i t y  jrdividual and cumulative 
(or regional) sources located anywhere from the park's 
boundaries to hundreds of miles away (or farther).
E. The Clean Air Act provides many opportunities to 
influence regulatory actions for the purpose of 
protecting park resources. The Federal Land Manager 
can require protection of park resources only in 
limited situations, however, such as refusing to 
certify "no adverse impact" for a major new source
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whose emissions would cause or contribute to an 
exceedance of the class I increment for sulfur dioxide 
or particulate matter. Currently, the CAA does not 
address several park resource protection ccrceins, 
including the impacts of sources not subject to PSD 
permit requirements, regional pollutant loading, and 
long-distant transport of pollutants.
C. The NPS Organic Act calls in strong language for 
protection of park values and purposes. It does not, 
however, contain an explicit enforcement provision 
addressing harmful activities on lands outside park 
boundaries. Constitutionally, Federal regulation could 
probably address such activities, and the Organic Act 
contains language that could be read to address such 
activities. Nevertheless, extra-boundary regulation is 
unlikely and vulnerable to judicial challenge without 
additional statutory authorization.
D. Trespass and nuisance actions against extraterritorial 
activities have been used to protect park values and 
purposes. The continued availability of such actions, 
in the context of air pollution is uncertain, however, 
i r> light of the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.
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Protection of National Park System Units from the 
Adverse Effects of Air Pollution
This memorandum is written in response 
analysis of the legal authority of the 
(DOI) to protect units of the National 
adverse effects of air pollution.
to your request for an 
Department of the Interior 
Park System (NPS) from the
Since its creation in 1916 the National Park Service has been 
charged with the responsibility of managing NPS units in such a 
way as to "conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
objects and the wildlife therein . . . ." (See 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 3.) That responsibility was reaffirmed in 1978. (See id.
la-1.) This memorandum examines the legal tools to carry out 
that responsibility insofar as it entails the protection of NPS 
units from the adverse effects of air pollution.
By and large, air pollution which adversely affects NPS units has 
its source outside those units and, therefore, outside the area 
of DO11s general park regulatory jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
authority of the Secretary of the Interior to address the harmful 
effects of air pollution within NPS units largely depends upon 
the extent to which existing law empowers the Secretary to 
regulate, control or otherwise affect air polluting activities 
outside NPS units which create those harmful effects within them.
CLEAN AIR ACT
The clearest grant of authority to the Secretary to protect NPS 
units from the harmful effects of air * pollution generated outside 
those units is contained in the Clean Air Act (CAA). (See 42 
U.S.C. 7401 , et seg. )
The CAA addresses air poll 
requires the Administrator 
(EPA) to prescribe primary 
quality standards tor each 
criteria are established, 
standards are designed to
ution at several 1 
of the Environmen 
and secondary nat 
air pollutant for 
( See _ic3. § 7409 ( a 
protect the public
evels. Initially, it 
tal Protection Agency 
ional ambient air 
which air quality 
).) Primary 
health from air
pollution; secondary standards to protect the public welfare.
(See id. § 7409(b).) These standards represent air quality goals 
applicable nationwide.
With respect to regions of the country which already have 
relatively clean air, the CAA imposes controls on additional air 
oollution. The prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of 
air quality in certain units of the NPS is addressed in Part C of 
the CAA. (See id. §§ 7470-7491.) Of particular relevance to 
such units are the statutory statements of Congressional purpose 
in section 7470;
(2) to preserve, protect, and enhance the air 
quality in national parks, national 
wilderness areas, national monuments, 
national seashores, and other areas of 
special national or regional natural, 
recreational, scenic, or historic value;
(3) to insure that economic growth will occur 
in a manner consistent with the preservation 
of existing clean air resources;
and
(5) to assure that any decision to permit 
increased air pollution in any urea to which 
this section applies is made only after 
careful evaluation of all consequences of 
such a decision and after adequate procedural 
opportunities for informed public 
participation in the decisionmaking process.
To those ends Congress has prescribed maximum allowable increases 
over baseline concentrations--and maximum allowable 
concentrations— for particulate matter and sulfur dioxide air 
pollution in three classes of the presumably cleaner air quality 
control regions of the country. (See id. §§ 7407 , 7473(a ),(b).)
While Congress did not prescribe similar limitations for other 
air pollutants, it did require the Administrator of EPA, after 
study and no later than August 7, 1979, to promulgate regulations 
to prevent the significant deterioration of air quality which 
would result from the emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, 
photochemical oxidants, and nitrogen oxides. (See id.
§ 7476(a).) In addition, it required the Administrator to
promulgate PSD regulations for other pollutants within two years 
after national ambient air quality standards are promulgated for 
those other pollutants. (Ibid.) To date the Administrator has 
adopted such regulations only for particulate matter and sulfur 
dioxide air pollution.
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Control of additional air pollution is to be accomplished by a 
permit system generally supervised by the states pursuant to 
EPA-approved implementation plans designed to prevent significant 
deterioration of air quality in those regions. (See id. §§ 7410,
7471, 7475.)
Of the foregoing "clean air" quality control regions, "class I" 
areas are to receive the greatest protection from additional air 
pollution. (See id. § 7473(b)(1).) Depending upon existing
levels of air pollution, the maximum allowable increases in 
concentration of controlled pollutants which are permitted in 
class I areas can provide significantly greater protection for 
these regions than is provided generally under the national 
ambient air quality standards. Progressively greater increases 
of air pollution are permitted in class II and class III areas. 
(See id^ § 7473(b)(2), (3).)
Class I areas include all of the following which were in 
existence on August 7, 1977: international parks, national
wilderness areas and memorial parks which exceed 5,000 acres in 
size, and national parks which exceed 6,000 acres in size. (Id.
§ 7472(a).) Unless redesignated as class I or class III areas
pursuant to section 7474 of that title, all other NPS units—  
including national monuments, smaller national parks, memorial 
parks and wilderness areas, and all NPS units designated after 
August 7, 1977— are class II areas. (Id. § 7472(b).)
Further, certain NPS units may be redesignated only as class I or 
class II. These units include all national monuments, primitive 
areas, preserves, recreation areas, wild and scenic rivers, 
lakeshores and seashores which exceed 10,000 acres in size (id'.
§ 7474(a)(1)) and all national parks and wilderness areas 
established after August 7, 1977, which exceed 10,000 acres in 
size (_id. § 7474(a)(2)).
Baseline concentrations of each pollutant for which a ceiling has 
been promulgated must be established before these provisions will 
have any effect on additional air pollution. Baseline 
concentrations are set in each air quality control region at the 
level of concentration of each regulated air pollutant existing 
at the time that the first application for permission to 
construct a "major emitting facility" is submitted to the state 
containing that region. (See id. §§ 7475(a), 7479(4).)
A major emitting facility is one of a specific list of stationary 
sources which emits or has the potential to emit at least one 
hundred tons per year of any air pollutant. (See id.
§ 7479(1).) Sources of air pollution which are not included in 
that specific list are not considered major emitting facilities 
subject to these regulations unless they have the potential to 
emit at least two hundred fifty tons per year of those 
pollutants. (Ibid.) Further, only emissions which come from a 
"point source"— such as a smoke stack— are included in the two 
hundred fifty ton per year threshold calculation unless the EPA
3
Administrator promulgates a regulation specifically including in 
that calculation emissions that otherwise "escape" a facility, 
such as "fugitive emissions." (See î d. § 7602(j); Alabama Power 
Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323/ 368-370 (1979).) Where no major 
emitting facility covered by these requirements has sought 
permission for construction, the PSD provisions of the CAA 
provide NPS units no protection against additional air pollution.
New major sources of air pollution which are subject to this 
permit process are required to perform detailed air quality 
impact analyses prior to filing a permit application, to install 
the best available control technology, and to conduct monitoring 
as necessary after operation of the facility has commenced. (id. 
§ 7475(a)(2)-(4), (a)(6)-(8), (e)(l)-(3).)
In addition, when a new major emitting facility may affect a 
federal "class I" area, the statute provides for notification of 
the responsible federal land manager and imposes upon him a 
particular duty to protect the air quality related values of the 
area. Section 7475(d)(2) provides:
(A) The [EPA] Administrator shall provide 
notice of the permit application to the 
Federal Land Manager and the Federal official 
charged with direct responsibility for 
management of any lands within a class I area 
which may be affected by emissions from the 
proposed facility.
(B) The Federal Land Manager and the Federal 
Official charged with direct responsibility 
for management of such lands shall have an 
affirmative responsibility to protect the air 
quality related values (including visibility) 
of any such lands within a class I area and 
to consider, in consultation with the 
Administrator, whether a proposed major 
emitting facility will have an adverse impact 
on such values.
In connection with NPS units the "Federal Land Manager" is the 
Secretary of the Interior (See id^ § 7602(i) ) or his delegate 
within the Department of the Interior (see Reorganization Plan 
No. 3 of 1950, 5 U.S.C. Appendix). The "Federal official charged 
with direct responsibility for management" of such lands 
presumably would be the park superintendent or comparable 
official.
The affirmative responsibility" of these federal officials is 
delineated in some detail. If either official files a notice 
alleging that emissions from the proposed major emitting facility 
may cause or contribute to" a change in the air quality in the 
class I area, a permit to construct the facility may not issue 
un ess the owner or operator of the facility demonstrates that 
any resulting pollution will not exceed the maximum increases 
allowable under the statute. (42 U.S.C. § 7475(d )(2)(C )(i)•) 
urther, even if the maximum allowable increases will not be
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exceeded b y  the proposed facility, a permit still may not issue 
if the Secretary demonstrates to the satisfaction of the state in 
which the facility is to be located that such facility 
nonetheless will have an "adverse impact on the air quality- 
related values (including visibility) of such" area. (Id.
$ 7475(d)(2)(C)(ii).)
Correspondingly, if the owner or operator of the proposed 
facility demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary that 
the emissions from the facility will not have an adverse impact 
on such values of that area, then the state may issue a 
construction permit notwithstanding the fact that the emissions 
will cause or contribute to increases in pollutant concentrations 
which exceed those otherwise allowable in the area. (Id.
§ 7475(d)(2)(C) ( iii) •)
The "air quality-related values" which are to be protected from 
the adverse impact of a proposed major emitting facility are not 
defined under the Clean Air Act. They are, however, discussed in 
the Senate report accompanying the bill from which the adverse 
impact determination provision of the 1977 Amendments was taken 
verbatim. The Senate report states:
[T]he term "air quality related values" of 
Federal lands designated as class I includes 
the fundamental purposes for which such lands 
have been established and preserved by the 
Congress and the responsible Federal agency.
For example, under the 1916 Organic Act to 
establish the National Park Service (16 
U.S.C. § 1), the purpose of such national 
park lands "is to conserve the scenery and 
the natural and historic objects and the 
wildlife therein and to provide for the 
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by 
such means as will leave them unimpaired for 
the enjoyment of future generations." (S.
Rep. No. 95-127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 
(1977).)
Similarly, in the preamble to its proposal of the regulations 
governing the prevention of significant deterioration of these 
values, EPA noted:
According to the legislative history of the 
Amendments, the term "air quality related 
values" includes the fundamental purpose for 
which such lands have been established and 
preserved by the Congress. In addition to 
visibility, which is specifically cited in 
the Amendments, other "air quality related 
values" that may be considered include odor, 
damage to flora and fauna, geologic and 
cultural characteristics, acid rain and 
climate. (42 Fed. Reg. 57,481 (1977).)
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In announcing initiation of the study required by 42 U.S.C.
§ 7474(d) to determine the importance of air quality related 
values to national monuments and preserves, the Department of the 
Interior defined the phrase as follows:
Air quality related values are all those 
values possessed by an area except those that 
are not affected by changes in air quality 
and include all those assets of an area whose 
vitality, significance, or integrity is 
dependent in some way upon the air 
environment. These values include visibility 
and those scenic, cultural, biological, and 
recreation resources of an area that are 
affected by air quality. (43 Fed. Reg.
15,016 (1978).)
By imposing upon the federal land manager the affirmative 
responsibility of protecting air quality related values of class 
I areas from adverse impact by any proposed major emitting 
facility, and by giving him a participatory role in that 
protection, the CAA provides the Secretary of the Interior with 
specific means for the protection of some NPS units from certain 
additional air pollution generated by enumerated sources.
The portion of the CAA regulating new major emitting facilities 
has been judicially construed to apply only to those facilities 
which are to be constructed in "clean air" areas. (See Alabama 
Power Co. v. Costle, supra, 636 F.2d at 368.). It does not apply 
to the construction of new major emitting facilities in 
nonattainment (non-clean air) areas, even if they will have an 
adverse impact on NPS units located in nearby class I areas.
Neither do these PSD/adverse impact protections extend: 1) to 
class II areas, which comprise the bulk of NPS units, 2) to 
existing emitting facilities, or 3) to facilities smaller than 
those designated in the statute.
Subpart II of part C of the CAA deals with visibility protection 
in certain NPS units. It is both broader and narrower in scope 
than subpart I. It is broader because it addresses existing as 
well as future visibility impairment; it is narrower because its 
protections are afforded only to "mandatory class I areas" i.e., 
statutorily defined class I areas that cannot be redesignated as 
a less protected class. In addition, it limits the role of the 
Secretary of the Interior in the process of protecting visibility 
in NPS units to a consultative one.
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In this regard, Congress has declared as a "national goal":
the prevention of any future, and the 
remedying of any existing, impairment of 
visibility in mandatory class I Federal areas 
which impairment results from manmade air 
pollution. (42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1).)
The statute directs the Administrator of EPA to promulgate 
regulations to carry out this national goal (see id.
§ 7491(a)(4)) and, after consultation with the Secretary of the 
Interior, to promulgate "a list of mandatory class I Federal 
areas in which he determines visibility is an important value."
(Id. § 7491(a)(2).) The "mandatory class I Federal areas" 
designated here are the specific NPS units described in section 
7472(a) as not being subject to redesignation to another class.
Regulations adopted by EPA pursuant to the CAA require state 
implementation plans to provide for notice to the Secretary of 
the Interior of the anticipated impacts on visibility in any 
Federal Class I area of any of those new major emitting 
facilities subject to the PSD permit process. (See 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.307(a)(1).) These plans also must provide for
" (c)onsideration" of any analysis by the Secretary indicating 
that the new source will adversely affect a class I area. (See 
id. § 51.307(a)(3).) Unlike the PSD regulations, those 
pertaining to visibility protection also ^jrport to govern new 
sources proposing to locate in non-attainment (non-"clean air") 
areas, if they will have an impact on visioility in any mandatory 
Class I area. (See i_d. § 51.307(b)(2).)
Apart from the consultative and analytical roles assigned to the 
Secretary of the Interior, the statute entrusts to the states the 
implementation of the national goal of preventing and remedying 
visibility impairment. Pursuant to regulations to be adopted by 
the EPA Administrator, state implementation plans must be 
designed to accomplish "reasonable progress" toward that national 
goal. (Id. § 7491(b)(2).) (EPA's regulations require each state 
plan to include a long-term (10-15 years) strategy for achieving 
that "reasonable progress." (40 C.F.R. § 51.306(a)(1).) In 
determining the reasonableness of its progress, each state is 
authorized to consider the cost, energy and other "nonair 
quality" impacts of measures which it might require for the 
reduction or prevention of visibility impairment. (42 U.S.C.
§ 7491(g)(1), (2).)
Pursuant to the statutory authority cited, the EPA Administrator 
has defined "visibility impairment" to mean "any humanly 
perceptible change in visibility (visual range, contrast, 
coloration) from that which would have existed under natural 
conditions." (40 C.F.R. § 51.301(x).) Presumably, such 
visibility impairment could be caused by a variety of manmade air 
pollutants.
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Existing regulations also afford the Secretary of the Interior a 
role in the identification of a specific resource described in 
the regulations which may be affected by air pollution and which 
may be found worthy of protection by the states in their 
implementation plans. The regulations define "visibility in any 
mandatory Class I Federal area" to include "any integral vista 
associated with that area" (id. § 51.301(y)) and authorize the 
Secretary of the Interior to identify integral vistas for 
consideration by the states in their implementation plans (id. § 
51.304(a)). An "integral vista" is defined to mean "a view 
perceived from within the mandatory Class I Federal area of a 
specific landmark or panorama located outside the boundary of the 
mandatory Class I Federal area." (Id. § 51.301(n).) (The 
validity of these regulations is being challenged in pending 
litigation.)
Under the regulations, the state is only required to consider in 
its cost/benefit analysis the harmful effects of air pollution 
upon any integral vista within its boundaries which has been 
identified by the Secretary according to criteria adopted by him. 
(Id. § 51.304(a), (d).) These criteria include, but are not 
limited to, "whether the integral vista is important to the 
visitor's visual experience" of the area. ( Id. § 51.304(a).)
Once an integral vista is identified properly, it is for the 
state to determine how much, if any, protection it should be 
afforded.
The Secretary's opportunity to identify integral vistas for 
consideration by the states in this process expires under current 
regulations on December 31, 1985. Absent identification by the 
Secretary, each state would be authorized to determine for itself 
which vistas, if any, are integral to any of the mandatory Class 
I Federal areas within its boundaries, and should be considered 
for protection. Pursuant to this regulatory scheme, on January 
15, 1981, DOI published a proposed guideline of criteria for the 
identification of integral vistas and a preliminary list of 
specific integral vistas identified according to those criteria. 
(See 46 Fed. Reg. 3646.)
The opportunity afforded the Secretary to identify adverse 
impacts on class I areas and associated integral vistas for their 
possible protection by the states represents DOI's primary role 
in the implementation of the national goal of preventing and 
reducing visibility impairment in the class I Federal areas 
described in the statute. Whether visibility in mandatory class 
I areas and associated integral vistas identified by him receive 
any protection from air pollution will depend upon the judgments 
of the concerned states in weighing the benefits of protection 
against its costs.
There are other laws upon which the Secretary may be able to rely 
to some extent in any effort to protect NPS units from air 
pollution. Unlike the CAA, none of these authorities focusses on
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air quality protection. On the other hand, some of them may 
afford the Secretary a more substantial role in their 
implementation than the CAA does.
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE ORGANIC ACT
The National Park Service Organic Act (16 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.) 
provides that the Park Service
shall promote and regulate the use of the 
Federal areas known as national parks, 
monuments, and reservations . . .  by such 
means and measures as conform to the 
fundamental purpose of the said parks, 
monuments, and reservations, which purpose is 
to conserve the scenery and the natural and 
historic objects and the wild life therein 
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same 
in such manner and by such means as will 
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of 
future generations. (Id. § 1.)
Section 3 of that title directs the Secretary of the Interior to 
"make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem 
necessary or proper for the use and management" of such areas.
In 1978 Congress amended NPS legislation n  reassert that the 
various areas of the NPS should be maintained in a manner 
consistent with the purpose established in title 16 U.S.C. § 1. 
More specifically, it declared:
Congress further reaffirms, declares, and 
directs that the promotion and regulation of 
the various areas of the National Park System 
. . . shall be consistent with and founded in 
the purpose established by section 1 [of 
title 16], to the common benefit of all the 
people of the United States. The 
authorization of activities shall be 
construed and the protection, management, and 
administration of these areas shall be 
conducted in light of the high public value 
and integrity of the National Park System and 
shall not be exercised in derogation of the 
values and purposes for which these various 
areas have been established, except as may 
have been or shall be directly and 
specifically provided by Congress. (16 
U.S.C. § la-1.)
The Organic Act was enacted pursuant to the Property Clause of 
the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress "to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .
. . (U.S. Const, art. IV, § 3, Cl.2.)
Two early United States Supreme Court decisions confirmed 
Congress' authority under the Property Clause to regulate 
activity occurring on non-federal property. (See Camfield v. 
United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) [upholding federal statute 
construed to prohibit fences on private land which had the effect 
of enclosing federal lands]; United States v. Alford, 274 U.S.
264 (1927) [upholding federal statute construed to prohibit the 
building of fires on private land near federal land without 
extinguishing them thereafter].)
The Court acknowledged the continued existence of that extra­
territorial legislative authority of Congress more recently in 
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). While the Court 
declined to define the limits of congressional power in that 
context, because the case before it did not demand that 
delineation, it nonetheless reiterated that "regulations under 
the Property Clause may have some effect on private lands not 
otherwise under federal control." (I_d. at 546)
Several subsequent federal appellate decisions have upheld the 
application of federal laws and implement ig regulations to non- 
federal lands within the boundaries of federal areas to further 
the purposes for which those federal areas are held. As the 
Ninth Circuit has observed:
[The Property Clause] grants to the United 
States power to regulate conduct on non- 
federal land when reasonably necessary to 
protect adjacent federal property or 
navigable waters. (United States v. Lindsey,
595 F .2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979).)
Pursuant to that analysis, statutes and regulations prohibiting 
or regulating activities within a federal conservation area 
regularly are applied to private inholdings.
For example, in Free Enterprise Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711
F. 2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983), the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
application to non-federal land of a National Park Service 
regulation prohibiting the "'delivery or retrieval within the 
boundaries of Ozark National Park Scenic Riverways' of rented 
watercraft without a permit." (Id. at 856.) The court declared:
It is undisputed that the United States acted 
within its constitutional authority in 
attempting to regulate the business 
activities of the members of the [plaintiff]
Association as they affect the ONSR, even
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though members themselves may never enter 
federally owned property, but strictly keep 
to state or county roads and rights-of-way 
within the ONSR.. (Id. at 855-856.)
In reaching that conclusion, the court cited its earlier 
construction of the Property Clause in state of Minnesota by 
Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 
455 U.S. 1007, in which it had
concluded that "[u]nder this authority to 
protect public land, Congress' power must 
extend to regulation of conduct on or off the 
public land that would threaten the 
designated purpose of federal lands." d̂_. at 
1249 (footnote omitted). See also United 
States v. Richard, 636 F.2d 236, 240 (8th 
Cir. 1980)(per curiam) ("federal regulation 
may exceed federal boundaries when 
necessary"), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1033 
. . . (1981) . . . .  (711 F.2d at 856.)
Accordingly, the Free Enterprise court affirmed both the criminal 
convictions of Association members for violating the regulation 
by retrieving canoes from non-federal land situated within the 
boundaries of the federal area without a permit, and the denial 
of the Association's civil claim for an injunction against the 
enforcement of that regulation on non-federal lands. (^d. at 
858. )
In State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, supra, 660 F .2d 
1240, the court similarly had upheld the application of federal 
law barring the use of motorized craft within a federally 
designated wilderness area to lands and waters under state 
jurisdiction falling within the boundaries of that area. In 
explanation of Congress' authority to regulate activities on 
non-federal land, the court reasoned:
Congress clearly has the power to dedicate 
federal land for particular purposes. As a 
necessary incident of that power, Congress 
must have the ability to insure that these 
lands be protected against interference with 
their intended purposes. As the Supreme 
Court has stated, under the property clause 
"[Congress] may sanction some uses and 
prohibit others, and may forbid interference 
with such as are sanctioned." McKelvey v.
United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 . . . (1922)
(emphasis added). (660 F.2d at 1249.)
Applying that analysis to the federal statutes under attack in 
that case, the court observed:
Thus, if Congress enacted the motorized use 
restrictions to protect the fundamental 
purpose for which the [wilderness area] had 
been reserved, and if the restrictions . . .
reasonably relate to that end, we must 
conclude that Congress acted within its 
constitutional prerogative. (I_d. at 1250.)
Concluding that the motorized use restrictions were a small part 
of an elaborate system of regulation considered necessary to 
preserve the area as a wilderness, the court held "that Congress 
acted within its power under the Constitution to pass needful 
regulations respecting public lands." (Id_. at 1251, footnote 
omitted. )
Still earlier, the same court held that under the Property Clause 
Congress could prohibit hunting on waters within the boundaries 
of Voyageurs National Park in Minnesota, even though the waters 
were subject to state jurisdiction. (United States v. Brown, 552
F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1977) cert, denied, 431 U.S. 949 ( 1977).) 
In Brown, the court upheld a conviction for violating Park 
Service regulations against hunting in a national park. (_Id. at 
319.) The hunter conceded that he was hunting ducks from a boat 
on waters within the park, but argued that the regulation did not 
apply to his conduct because the waters were owned by the state. 
In an alternative holding the court rejected this defense. The 
court declared:
Assuming arguendo that the state did not cede 
jurisdiction over the waters in the park, we 
further conclude that the federal regulations 
prohibiting hunting in Voyageurs Park were a 
constitutional exercise of congressional 
power under the Property Clause. (_Id. at 
821, footnote omitted.)
It would thus appear that by the adoption of the Organic Act, as 
amended, Congress has delegated to the Secretary of the Interior 
the general authority to impose reasonable regulations upon 
private inholdinqs in NPS units for the protection of those units 
and the primary purposes for which they were established and are 
maintained. Other specific examples of such delegation appear in 
16 U.S.C. § 1902 ("all activities resulting from the exercise of 
valid existing mineral rights on patented or unpatented mining 
claims within any area of the National Park System shall be 
subject to such regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 
Interior as he deems necessary or desirable for the preservation 
and management of those areas."); and 16 U.S.C. la-2(h) 
(authorizing the Secretary to "promulgate and enforce regulations 
concerning boating and other activities on or relating to waters 
located within areas of the National Park System, including 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States • . • •")
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However, most air pollution harmful to NPS units does not 
originate within NPS units. The issue is whether NPS Organic ^ct 
authority may be applied to air polluting activities occurring 
outside those units.
The court decisions do not yet recognize congressional 
delegations of regulatory authority to federal land managers-- 
such as the Secretary— as including extra-territorial 
jurisdiction for the protection of lands within their 
jurisdiction. However, it has been suggested that existing laws 
governing regulatory jurisdiction over inholdings could support 
that recognition.
The general responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior 
have long been recognized by the Supreme Court:
The Secretary is the guardian of the people 
of the United States over the public lands.
The obligations of his oath of office oblige 
him to see that the law is carried out, and 
that none of the public domain is wasted or 
is disposed of to a party not entitled to it.
(Knight v. U.S. Land Association, 142 U.S.
161, 181 (1891).)
That prescription, considered in light of the Court's 
acknowledgment that Congress may "forbid interference with" the 
particular purposes and uses for which it has dedicated federal 
land (see McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922), 
logically would appear to be as supportive of the Secretary's 
efforts to protect NPS units from external threats as it has been 
found applicable to internal threats.
Indeed, the analyses of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits discussed 
above in the latter context seem equally appropriate to the 
former. There is no obvious reason why the "power to regulate 
conduct on non-federal land when reasonably necessary to protect 
adjacent federal property" (see United States v. Lindsey, supra, 
595 F.2d at 6) should extend to internally-adjacent, but not 
externally-adjacent non-federal lands in comparable promixity to 
the federal holdings. Similarly, the court's explanation of 
congressional authority to regulate inholdings in State of 
Minnesota, supra, 660 F.2d at 1249-1250, seems equally suited to 
external threats.
In State of Minnesota the court first noted the Supreme Court's 
recent reminder that "regulations under the Property Clause may 
have some effect on private lands not otherwise under Federal 
control." (Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra, 426 U.S. at 546.) It 
pointed out that in Kleppe the high court had relied upon 
Camfield v. United States, in which it had concluded many years 
earlier ~'
that Congress possessed the power to control 
conduct occurring off federal property 
through its "power of legislating for the 
protection of the public lands, though it .nay 
thereby involve the exercise of what is 
ordinarily known as the police power, so long 
as such power is directed solely to [the 
public lands'] own protection." Canfield v. 
United States, supra, 167 U.S. at 526 . . . . 
(State of Minnesota, supra, 660 F .2d at
1249. )
From this premise, the court continued:
Under this authority to protect public land, 
Congress' power must extend to regulation of 
conduct on or off the public land that would 
threaten the designated purpose of federal 
lands. Congress clearly has the power to 
dedicate federal land for particular 
purposes. As a necessary incident of that 
power, Congress must have the ability to 
insure that these lands be protected against 
interference with their intended purposes . . 
. . Thus, if Congress enacted the . . . 
restrictions to protect the fundamental 
purpose for which the [federal irea] had been 
reserved, and if the restrictions . . . 
reasonably relate to that end, we must 
conclude that Congress acted within its 
constitutional prerogative. (Id. at 1249-
1250, footnote omitted.)
Despite the logical applicability of the foregoing analysis to 
external threats, it must be acknowledged that the courts have 
yet to recognize secretarial regulatory authority under existing 
law to protect NPS units from those threats. While the 
Secretary's responsibilities have been identified, his means of 
acquitting them have not.
The tension between the clearly perceived secretarial duty and 
the less clearly delineated authority to acquit it is apparent in 
three successive opinions of the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California in a case brought to compel the 
Secretary to use his powers to protect Redwood National Park from 
damage allegedly caused or threatened by certain logging 
operations on privately owned land on the periphery of the park.
In the first of the three, in denying Interior Department motions 
to dismiss the action and for summary judgment, the court cited 
both the Organic Act and the Redwood National Park Act (16 U.S.C. 
§§ 79a-79j) as empowering the Secretary to protect the park from 
the threats perceived. (Sierra Club v. Department of Interior,
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376 F. Supp. 90, 93 (N.D.Cal. 1974).) However, it was the 
specific mandate of the Redwood legislation upon which the court 
relied to discern specifically enforceable duties.
We are of the opinion that the terms of the 
statute, especially § 79c(e), authorizing the 
Secretary "in order to afford as full 
protection as is reasonably possible to the 
timber, soil, and streams within the 
boundaries of the park"— "to acquire 
interests in land from, and to enter into 
contracts and cooperative agreements with, 
the owners of land on the periphery of the 
park and on the watersheds tributary to 
streams within the park"— impose a legal duty 
on the Secretary to utilize the specific 
powers given to him whenever reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the park and 
that any discretion vested in the Secretary 
concerning time, place and specifics of the 
exercise of such powers is subordinate to his 
paramount legal duty imposed . . .  to protect 
the park. (376 F. Supp. at 96.)
In the second opinion, after trial, the court described the issue 
for decision as whether the Secretary had taken reasonable steps 
to protect the resources of Redwood National Park and, if not, 
whether his failure to do so was arbitrary, capricious or an 
abuse of discretion. (Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 
F. Supp. 284, 286 (N.D.Cal. 1975).) In reaching its conclusion 
that the Secretary had not carried out his responsibilities 
properly, the court noted:
[T]he conduct of the Secretary must be 
considered in the light of a very unique 
statute— a statute which did more than 
establish a national park; it also expressly 
vested the Secretary with authority to take 
certain specifically stated steps designed to 
protect the Park from damage caused by 
logging operations on the surrounding 
privately owned lands. (398 F. Supp. at 
286.)
Accordingly, while once again citing both the Organic Act and the 
Redwood National Park Act in support of its general conclusion, 
the court's order setting forth the specific "reasonable steps" 
that the Secretary might be obliged to take "within a reasonable 
time" to acquit his statutory responsibilities included only 
those actions identified in the "unique" Redwood park enabling 
legislation, to wit: acquiring interests in land and/or entering 
into cooperative agreements with adjoining landowners (see 16 
U.S.C. § 79c(e)), and modifying park boundaries (see id.
§ 79b(a)). (398 F. Supp. at 294.)
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The remainder of the court’s order revealingly included within 
possible secretarial action requests to Congress for additional 
funds and for clarification as to "whether the powers and duties 
of defendants, as herein found, are to remain or should be 
modified." (398 F. Supp. at 294) In short, when it came to 
implementing its determination that the Secretary was obliged to 
act to carry out his statutory duties, the court implicitly 
acknowledged that additional congressional action would be 
necessary before the Secretary would be empowered to do anything 
to that end not specified in the Redwood legislation.
Finally, in its third opinion, issued approximately a year 
later— after the Secretary reported essentially that he had 
apprised Congress of the state of the matter, and had neither 
funds nor authority to take the other actions proposed by the 
court in its second opinion— the court purged the Secretary of 
his previously found failure. (Sierra Club v. Department of 
Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 175-176 (N.D.Cal. 1976).) The court 
observed:
The court further finds that, in order 
adequately to exercise its powers and perform 
its duties in a manner adequately to protect 
the Park, Interior now stands in need of new 
Congressional legislation and/or new 
Congressional appropriations. 'Id. at 175.)
Thus, it would seem clear that the Redwood cases did not support 
the notion that the Organic Act endows the Secretary with 
extensive extra-territorial jurisdiction which would allow him to 
protect NPS units from threats originating on lands without them. 
To the contrary, the clear implication of these cases is that the 
Secretary's extra-territorial power is limited to that expressly 
identified by Congress.
At least partly in response to the Redwood cases, Congress 
amended the Organic Act in 1978, adopting what is now 16 U.S.C. § 
la-1. In submitting a draft bill to Congress for the purpose of 
expanding Redwood National Park, the Secretary of the Interior 
had sought express authority to regulate timbering activities on 
non-federal lands adjacent to the park in order to protect park 
resources from those activities. (See H. Rep. No. 95-531, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 32-34 (August 5, 1977); S. Rep. No 528, 95th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 18-20 (Oct. 21, 1977).) Whether the Secretary's 
motivation in so doing was to clarify existing authorities or to 
create new ones is not clear. In any event, while the measure 
was adopted by the House of Representatives, it was rejected by 
the Senate on the ground that the problems to be addressed at 
Redwood National Park were "too urgent to place reliance on such 
a new concept" (i.e., legislation authorizing extra-territorial 
regulations). (S. Rep. No. 528, supra, 8.) Instead, Congress 
enacted the language now contained in section la-1.
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In Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), the 
court addressed the claim that the Secretary had tailed to carry 
out his duties under the newly amended Organic Act, inter alia. 
The claim was based upon the Secretary's failure to assert and 
protect federal reserved water rights alleged to be threatened by 
various energy-related developments external to NPS units which 
sought to establish water rights under state law.
The court first identified the responsibilities of the Secretary 
by reference to the legislative history of the 1978 amendment to 
the Organic Act set forth in title 16 U.S.C. § la-1:
"The Secretary has an absolute duty, which is 
not to be compromised, to fulfill the mandate 
of the [Organic] Act to take whatever actions 
and seek whatever relief as will safeguard 
the units of the National Park System."
Senate Report 95-528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
9 (October 21, 1977) . . . .
Thus, it seems clear that in the event of a 
real and immediate water supply threat to the 
scenic, natural, historic or biotic resource 
values of the [NPS units there involved], the 
Secretary must take appropriate action.
However, nowhere in either 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 or 
la-1 is there a specific direct ion as to how 
the protection of Park resources and their 
federal administration is to be effected . .
. . The Court concludes that defendants have 
broad discretion in determining what actions 
are best calculated to protect Park 
resources. (487 F. Supp. at 448.)
The court then enumerated actions that the Secretary might take 
if the threats alleged by plaintiffs were found to be "real and 
immediate."
Such actions may include, but are not limited 
to: 1) asserting reserved water rights, 2)
acquiring water rights and rights-of-way, 16 
U.S.C. § 17j — 2 ( 1976), 3) denying the land 
exchange and rights-of-way which may 
constitute or aid a threat to Park resources,
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1716, 1761, 1765 (West Supp.
1979), or 4) bringing trespass or nuisance 
actions if appropriate. (Ibid.)
However, because the court found that there was no real or 
immediate threat to the Park resource alleged by plaintiffs to be 
in jeopardy——i•e •, reserved water rights--it concluded that the 
Secretary's failure to assert those rights had a rational basis 
and dismissed the actions. (Id. at 450.)
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It is arguable that the court’s discussion of actions that the 
Secretary might take to protect Park resources was dictum because 
of its preliminary conclusion that no threat existed which 
required any action on his part. Sven if that discussion //as -iot 
dictum, however, two things must be acknowledged: Most of the
actions described— reserved water rights assertion, acquisition 
of rights and denial of exchanges or rights to others— were 
authorized specifically by independent legislative or clearly 
established common law sources. For the remaining possible 
actions— bringing trespass or nuisance actions, if appropriate—  
the court offered no further explanation to demonstrate their 
viability. While it is understandable that it would not engage 
in extended analysis of the possibility of such actions in view 
of its conclusion that no actions were required, the court's 
reference to reliance upon these common law remedies provides no 
guidance in their possible use for the protection of NPS units 
from external threats. (These remedies are discussed further 
below.)
In addition to the foregoing constitutional and statutory 
concerns, there is an administrative one. Traditionally, the 
exercise of regulatory jurisdiction pursuant to the Organic Act 
has been limited to activities occurring within the boundaries of 
NPS units. While that past practice does not automatically bar a 
more expansive interpretation of the Act to authorize 
extraterritorial regulation, it seems rea-onable to suppose that 
the validity of such regulation would be -ubjected to challenge 
in the courts by newly affected parties. In such challenge, both 
the Secretary of the Interior's long standing interpretation of 
his regulatory power under the Organic Act as relating to 
activities within the boundaries of NPS units and the absence of 
recent judicial extension of federal regulatory power generally 
under the Property Clause would militate against acceptance of 
that broader interpretation. Under the circumstances, the 
utility of the administrative reinterpretation of the Organic Act 
to support new regulation of park-threatening activities on non- 
federal lands outside the boundaries of NPS units remains 
untested and uncertain.
It is also possible that the Organic Act may be used in 
conjunction with other law to provide an additional means for the 
protection of NPS units from external threats. That possibility 
arises when the language of 16 U.S.C. § la-1 is considered in 
light of the Secretary's statutory duties relating to the 
administration of federal lands other than NPS units.
For example, federally owned coal located without the boundaries, 
but in the vicinity of, NPS units may be leased in the discretion 
of the Secretary of the Interior. (30 U.S.C. § 201(a).) The 
manner in which that discretion is exercised obviously may have 
an effect on nearby NPS units. The question is whether the 
mandate of the Organic Act has any bearing on the Secretary's 
exercise of that discretion.
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In the context of the "promotion and regulation" of NPS units 
consistently with the original Act's purpose, the relevant 
language reads:
The authorization of activities shall be 
construed and the protection, management, and 
administration of these areas shall be 
conducted in light of the high public value 
and integrity of the National Park System and 
shall not be exercised in derogation of the 
values and purposes for which these various 
areas have been established, except as may 
have been or shall be directly and 
specifically provided by Congress. (16-U.S.C.
§ la-1.)
The legislative history of section la-1 does not clarify the 
limits of its application. On the one hand, it could be argued 
from the context of the statute that the policy set forth therein 
relates solely to the regulation of activities occurring within 
NPS units as those activities may bear upon the purposes for 
which such lands have been dedicated. If so, the statute 
provides no additional guidance for dealing with external 
threats.
On the other hand, because of its inherent- ambiguity, the statute 
could be construed to relate to the total range of programmatic 
discretion vested in the Secretary under i variety of laws, 
including the coal leasing statutes. How the Secretary exercises 
that discretion could have relevance to the "promotion" of NPS 
units. If that interpretation were substantiated, the statutory 
policy could be useful in the Secretary's attempt to protect NPS 
units from external threats originating on other lands under his 
j urisd ict ion.
However, the latter interpretation would itself generate further 
interpretive problems. The last clause of the excerpt quoted 
from section la-1 excepts from the generally protective thrust of 
the statute those activities which "may have been or shall be 
directly and specifically provided by Congress." The question 
is: To which statutorily authorized activities does this
exception apply?
It can be argued that all laws authorizing the Secretary to 
undertake or oversee developmental activities— such as the coal 
leasing or surface mine permitting statutes--are "directly and 
specifically provided by Congress," and so excepted from the 
policy defined in section la-1. Another reading of the exception 
would limit it to those secretarial duties mandated by Congress. 
The narrowest interpretation of the exception would require 
statutory acknowledgement of the possible adverse consequences of 
authorized or mandated activities to NPS units before it became 
applicable. In these last cases there could be little question 
that Congress meant the exception to apply.
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Neither section la-1 nor its legislative history speaks directly 
to the issue, however, and it would appear that resolution o£ 
conflicts between the directive of section la-1 and other 
statutory authorities must be undertaken on an ad_ hoc basis 
pending judicial clarification. For all of the foregoing 
reasons, the Organic Act, whether utilized independently or in 
conjunction with other laws, currently is neither a certain nor 
an expeditious tool for the protection of NPS units from the 
harmful effects of air pollution originating outside those units.
Other statutory programs administered by the Secretary have 
specific reference to the protection of NPS units. The Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act is one.
SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT
The primary protections for NPS units under this Act (30 U.S.C.
§ 1201, et seg.) can be found in section 1272. Insofar as 
relevant to our inquiry, section 1272(e) provides that after 
August 3, 1977, and subject to "valid existing rights", no 
surface coal mining operations which did not exist on that date 
shall be permitted:
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of 
units of the National Park System, the 
National Wildlife Refuge System, the National 
System of Trails, the National ilderness 
Preservation System, the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers System, including study rivers 
designated under section 1276(a) of title 16 
and National Recreation Areas designated by 
Act of Congress;
(3) which will adversely affect any publicly 
owned park or places included in the National 
Register of Historic Sites unless approved 
jointly by the regulatory authority and the 
Federal, State, or local agency with 
jurisdiction over the park or the historic 
site;
(5) . . . within three hundred feet of any .
. . public park . . . .
It should be emphasized that these prohibitions against new 
surface coal mining within the NPS units identified (including 
private inholdings within the boundaries of these units), and 
within a three-hundred foot buffer zone surrounding any "public 
park, and on other land when it will "adversely affect" the 
public lands indicated, are subject to an important exception:
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Each of the three mining prohibitions set forth is subject to 
"valid existing rights." Until recently, those rights generally 
were defined as follows:
A person possesses valid existing rights for 
an area protected under section [1272(e)] on 
August 3, 1977, if the application of any of 
the prohibitions contained in that section to 
the property interest that existed on that 
date would effect a taking of the person's 
property which would entitle the person to 
just compensation under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution; (30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a).)
In addition,
A person possesses valid existing rights if 
the person proposing to conduct surface coal 
mining operations can demonstrate that the 
coal is both needed for, and immediately 
adjacent to, an ongoing surface coal mining 
operation which existed on August 3, 1977. A 
determination that coal is "needed for" will 
be based upon a finding that the extension of 
mining is essential to make the surface coal 
mining operation as a whole economically 
viable; (Id. § 761.5(c).)
However, in a recent round of lit 
Secretary's regulations under thi 
definitions were remanded for his 
by the district court that he had 
notice and comment requirements o 
Act. (In Re: Permanent Surface M
79-1144 (D.D.C. March 22, 1985) ( 
Pending promulgation of acceptabl 
existing rights," it is virtually 
reasonably accurate analysis of t 
NPS units by the foregoing prohib 
coal mining.
igation challenging the 
s Act, both regulatory 
reconsideration upon a finding 
failed to comply with the 
f the Administrative Procedures 
ining Regulation Litigation, No.
Mem. Op. at pp. 4-11, 18-20).) 
e regulations defining "valid 
impossible to provide any 
he degree of protection provided 
itions against certain surface
Apart from such "valid existing rights," the prohibitions against 
mining within the federal areas identified and within 300 feet of 
public parks are fairly straightforward. Less clear is the 
regulation of surface coal mining in areas outside these units 
which will "adversely affect any publicly owned park." (30 
U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3).) The Act sets forth no specific indication 
as to when surface coal mines may be found to threaten such 
adverse effect.
For example, one relevant provision directs coal operators "to 
effectively control erosion and attendant air and water pollution 
. . . ." (Id. § 1265(b)(4).) However, an attempt by the
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Secretary to protect air quality by regulating all fugitive dust 
emissions from surface coal mines under this provision was struck 
down by the court as an overbroad interpretation of the statute. 
(In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, No. 7 9-
1144 (D.D.C. May 16, 1980 ) (Mem. Op. at pp. 27 — 29) • ) The court 
ruled that only air pollution related to erosion could be 
regulated under this statute, notwithstanding the Secretary's 
apparent assertion that in this context "most sources of air 
pollution stem from surface mining operations unrelated to 
erosion activities." (Id. at p. 28.) The court observed: 
"Moreover, if Congress wanted the Secretary to develop 
regulations protecting air quality, it could have done so in a 
straightforward manner." (I_d. at p. 29.) In a subsequent 
opinion, the court reaffirmed its ruling, relying on the Act 
itself (see 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)) to conclude that "EPA has the 
authority to regulate fugitive dust from surface mines under the 
Clean Air Act . . . ." (July 6, 1984 mem. opn. at p. 34.)
In the only reported case of which we are aware that raised the 
issue of park protection in the context of section 1272, former 
Secretary of the Interior Andrus concluded that surface coal mine 
fugitive dust at levels expected to result from a mining 
operation in the Alton Coal Fields in close proximity to Bryce 
Canyon National Park would not adversely affect the park. ' He did 
not, however, exclude consideration of such dust in ascertaining 
adverse effects. In addition, he concluded that other aspects of 
the mining operation (including noise and unsightliness) would 
adversely affect the park and, accordingly, determined that such 
land was "unsuitable" for mining. That decision was upheld by 
the United States District Court in Utah Intern, v. Dept, of 
Interior of the U.S., 553 F. Supp. 872 (C.D. Utah 1982).
In addition to the three specific prohibitions set forth in 
section 1272(e), supra, the Act authorizes any person "having an 
interest which is or may be adversely affected" by surface coal 
mining to petition the Secretary of the Interior to have an area 
designated as unsuitable for mining. (30 U.S.C. § 1272(c).) 
Similarly, the Secretary is himself directed to determine whether 
there are federal lands which are unsuitable for surface coal 
mining. (Ld. § 1272(b).) Insofar as relevant here, a 
determination of unsuitability would require a finding that the 
mining operations will "affect fragile or historic lands in which 
such operations could result in significant damage to important 
historic, cultural, scientific, and esthetic values and natural 
systems." (_Id. § 1272(a)(3)(B).) The Alton decision upheld in 
Utah Intern., supra, was precipitated by a petition filed 
pursuant to section 1272(c) by several individuals and groups 
interested in environmental protection.
Although "valid existing rights" are 
the statutory unsuitability petition 
the Interior Board of Surface Mining 
that exemption into the process. In 
concluded that land which is open to
not expressly exempted from 
process, a recent ruling of 
Appeals has incorporated 
that ruling the Board 
surface coal mining as a
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result of valid existing rights cannot be designated unsuitable 
for mining pursuant to a petition filed under section 1272(c)." 
(See In Re: Shavers Fork Watershed Unsuitability Petition, t b s ma
81-64, 4 IBSMA 192, 197 (Dec. 10, 1982).)
It is apparent that the current applicability of the "valid 
existing rights" exemption to both the specific prohibitions 
against surface coal mining set forth in section 1272(e) and the 
unsuitability petition process of section 1272(c) contributes to 
the substantial uncertainty concerning the amount of protection 
from air pollution available to NPS units under the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, as that Act was construed by 
the May 16, 1980, and July 6, 1984, opinions in In Re: Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra.
COMMON LAW ACTIONS
It has been suggested that protection of NPS units from external 
threats— such as air pollution— could be accomplished through 
traditional common law actions like those for nuisance or 
trespass, where appropriate. (See Sierra Club v. Andrus, supra, 
487 F. Supp. at 488.) (Because the same principles apply to the 
availability of both remedies, we will limit our discussion to 
the former.) Initially, it must be noted that such remedies are 
cumbersome and by their nature can be invoked only after the 
damage is done or appears inevitable.
More importantly, there currently is substantial doubt as to the 
availability of these remedies in this context because Congress 
has addressed air quality protection in N^S units--as elsewhere 
--comprehensively in the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the regulatory 
scheme mandated therein. This legislative initiative impinges 
upon both federal common law and state common law governing these 
remedies.
In the early 1900's the United States Supreme Court utilized 
federal common law to resolve interstate air and water pollution 
problems, without labeling it as such. (See Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 
496 (1906).) In 1971 the Tenth Circuit invoked the federal 
common law by name to address a claim by the State of Texas that 
pesticide runoff from the State of New Mexico was polluting its 
waters, declaring: "Federal common law and not the varying common 
law of the individual States is . . .  a basis for dealing in 
uniform standard with the environmental rights of a State against 
improper impairment by sources outside its domain." (Texas v. 
Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir., 1971).)
Subsequently, the Supreme Court adopted the same approach in 
another interstate water pollution dispute. "When we deal with 
air or water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a 
federal common law." (Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee
I) 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972), footnote omitted.) It explained that 
the courts had fashioned a federal common law "where there is an
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overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of 
decis ion  or where the controversy touches basic interests of 
federalism . . . . " (Idj. at 105, n. 6.)
Shortly after Milwaukee I was decided, Congress passed the 1972 
Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 
which created a permit system for the discharge of pollutants 
into interstate waters. (See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376.) In a 
subsequent stage of the water pollution dispute between Illinois 
and Milwaukee, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal common 
law of nuisance had been supplanted in the water pollution field 
by the adoption of the FWPCA. (Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 
II) , 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981 ).) The court declared:
Federal common law is a "necessary 
expedient," . . . and when Congress addresses 
a question previously governed by a decision 
rested on federal common law the need for 
such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by 
federal courts disappears. (Id. at 314, 
citation omitted.)
The Court noted that the Pankey case, upon which it relied 
extensively in Milwaukee I, had itse.lf observed that "federal 
common law applies '[ujntil the field has been made the subject 
of comprehensive legislation or authorize! administrative 
standards . . . . ' "  ( Ibid. , quoting Tex =» v . Pankey, supra, 441 
F.2d at 241.) The appropriate question, the Milwaukee II court 
said, was "whether the legislative scheme 'spoke directly to a 
question' . . . not whether Congress had affirmatively proscribed 
the use of federal common law." (451 U.S. at 315.)
The Court concluded that in context of the problem before it,
Congress has not left the formulation of 
appropriate federal standards to the courts 
through application of often vague and 
indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of 
equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied 
the field through the establishment of a 
comprehensive regulatory program supervised 
by an expert administrative agency. (Id. at 
317.) --
Further, with respect to the content of the legislative approach 
to the problem perceived, the Court declared:
Although a federal court may disagree with 
the regulatory approach taken by the agency 
with responsibility for issuing permits under 
the Act, such disagreement alone is no basis 
for the creation of federal common law. . . .
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The question is whether the field has been 
occupied, not whether it has been occupied in 
a particular manner. (Id. at 323, 324.)
Two months later, in a case rejecting the common law claims of 
fishermen against various governmental entities for damage to 
fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumpage of sewage 
and other waste, the Court laid to rest any doubt in the matter.
The Court has now held that the federal 
common law of nuisance in the area of water 
pollution is entirely preempted by the more 
comprehensive scope of the FWPCA . . . .
(Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea 
Clammers, 452 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981).)
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of 
preemption of any federal common law of nuisance in the area of 
air pollution, the foregoing analysis of the closely analogous 
problem in the water pollution area would seem controlling. The 
CAA, like the FWPCA, establishes a comprehensive regulatory 
program supervised by the same expert administrative agency— EPA. 
Whatever objections may be posed to the manner in which Congress 
has elected to regulate air pollution under that program, it can 
hardly be denied that Congress has addressed the question 
d i rectly.
On this reasoning, at least one federal court has dismissed a 
nuisance action for damages brought by the United States against 
a landfill operator, declaring:
Since Congress has addressed the problem of 
air pollution in the Clean Air Act, I find 
that the statute pre-empts plaintiff's 
federal common-law claim for nuisance.
(United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp.
699, 702 (D.N.J. 1982).
Similarly, in successive opinions, the Second Circuit affirmed 
dismissal of federal common law nuisance claims brought against 
EPA (New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 632 F.2d 936 (2 Cir.
1980)) and a lighting company (New England Legal Foundation v. 
Costle, 666 F.2d 30 (2 Cir. 1981)) for the latter's use of a high 
sulfur fuel after EPA approval. While the court did not reach 
the "broad question of whether the Clean Air Act totally preempts 
federal common law nuisance actions based on the emission of 
chemical pollutants into the air" (id^ at 32), its analysis 
followed the rationale underlying preemption determinations:
Our affirmance is specifically on the ground 
that the EPA's approval of [the lighting 
company's] use of high sulphur fuel precludes
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appellants from maintaining a common law 
nuisance action against [the company].
(Ibid.)
It has been suggested that the CAA's "saving" clauses may 
preserve federal common law remedies. However, there would seem 
to be little basis for so concluding.
In the section of the CAA authorizing "citizen suits," there is 
the following provision:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to 
seek enforcement of any emission standard or 
limitation or to seek any other relief . . .
. (42 U.S.C. § 7604(e).)
In Milwaukee II, however, the Supreme Court rejected the claim 
that practically identical language--substituting the word 
"effluent" for "emission"— contained in the citizen-suit section 
of the FWPCA (33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)) had the saving effect also 
argued for in that case. The Court noted:
The subsection is common language 
accompanying citizen-suit provi'ions and we 
think it means only that the provision of 
such suit does not revoke other remedies. It 
most assuredly cannot be read to mean that 
the Act as a whole does not supplant formerly 
available federal common-law actions . . . .
(451 U.S. at 329 ; accord Kin-Buc, Inc. , 
supra, 532 F. Supp. at 703.)
It is suggestive of a "substantive" approach to preemption 
analysis that the Court found federal common law preempted by the 
FWPCA notwithstanding fairly specific evidence to the contrary in 
the relevant legislative history. As the Milwaukee II dissent 
argued:
[T]he Court ignores express statements of 
legislative intent that contradict its 
position. The Senate Report accompanying the 
1972 legislation explicitly describes the 
congressional intent informing [33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(e)] :
"It should be noted, however, that 
the section would specifically 
preserve any rights or remedies 
under any other law. Thus, if 
damages could be shown, other 
remedies would remain available. 
Compliance with requirements under
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this Act would not be a defense to 
a common law action for pollution 
damages." S. Rep. NO 92-414, p. 81 
(1971), reprinted in 2 Legislative 
History of the Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 
(Committee Print compiled for the 
Senate Committee on Public Works by 
the Library of Congress). Ser. No.
93-1, p. 1499 (1973) (Leg. Hist.)
This deliberate preservation of all remedies 
previously available at common law makes no 
distinction between the common law of 
individual States and federal common law.
(451 U.S. at 343, Blackmun, J., dissenting, 
footnote omitted.)
Apparently, the Milwaukee II majority was guided by the 
appropriateness of the statutory solution— because of the 
latter's comprehensive approach to a complex problem requiring 
oversight by an expert administrative agency— in finding federal 
common law had been preempted in the area of water pollution 
control by the FWPCA, nothwithstanding evidence of contrary 
congressional intent. A similar approach would seem likely with 
respect to air pollution and the CAA.
The CAA also contains the following provision:
[T]his chapter [title 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642] 
shall not be construed as superseding or 
limiting the authorities and 
responsibilities, under any other provision 
of law, of the [EPA] Administrator or any 
other Federal official, department or agency.
(42 U.S.C. § 7610(a).)
It may be argued that this provision could be read to preserve 
the Secretary's option to utilize common law remedies— such as 
nuisance actions--to address sources of air pollution outside NPS 
units which threaten those units. By comparison, the FWPCA's 
similar "saving" clause is more qualified, preserving only "the 
authority or functions of any officer or agency of the United 
States not inconsistent with this chapter . . . ." (33 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a).)
Neither Milwaukee II nor Seaclammers discussed the effect of 
section 1371(a) on their respective conclusions that the FWPCA 
preempted federal common law in the area of water pollution.
Those preemption determinations, however, at least implicitly 
reject any "saving" effect of that section. Nonetheless, because 
of the more comprehensive "saving" language of the CAA provision 
embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 7610(a), it can be argued that the
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Court's implicit determination that 33 U.S.C. S 1371(a) does not 
preserve federal common law actions has less bearing on any 
similar argument which might be made under the C\A.
However, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would conclude 
Congress preserved the viability of judicially created federal 
common law rights of action, such as those for nuisance, in this 
general formulation. If the Court was willing to find pre­
emption of federal common law by the FWPCA notwithstanding the 
specific contrary legislative history noted by the dissent in 
Milwaukee II (and discussed above), it would seem unlikely to be 
swayed by the argument that the CAA sought to preserve federal 
common law by the general language of section 7610(a). (It would 
seem reasonable to suppose that the contrary view, of a federal 
district court which had relied upon the court of appeal decision 
vacated in Milwaukee II (see United States v. Atlantic-Richfield 
Co. , 478 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (D. Mont. 1979 )) has lost its 
foundation. (See Kin-Buc, Inc, supra, 532 F. Supp. at 702.))
Considering the tenor of the Court's preemption analysis under 
the FWPCA and the similarly comprehensive approach to air 
pollution under the CAA, little reliance can be placed upon 
sections 7604(e) and 7610(a) as preservers of a federal common 
law of nuisance in this context.
There are other differences between the C\,\ and the FWPCA, of 
course, and only judicial interpretation an determine whether 
the former, like the latter, has "occupiei the field" to the 
exclusion of federal common law. It is our opinion, however, 
that the Secretary cannot rely with confidence upon any federal 
common law of nuisance in any effort to protect NPS units from 
the adverse effects of air pollution generated outside the 
boundaries of those units.
By implication Milwaukee II raises--but does not analyze or 
resolve--the possibility of the existence of another body of law 
which may support nuisance actions for relief from air pollution: 
the common law of the States. For comparison in discussing pre­
emption of federal common law by federal statutes the Court 
observed:
Contrary to the suggestions of respondents, 
the appropriate analysis in determining if 
federal statutory law governs a question 
previously the subject of federal common law 
is not the same as that employed in deciding 
if federal law pre-empts state law. In 
considering the latter question "'we start 
with the assumption that the historic public 
powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 
(1977)(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
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Corp», 331 U.S. 218 , 230 (1947)). While we 
have not hesitated to find pre-emption of 
state law, whether express or implied, when 
Congress has so indicated, see Ray v. Atantic 
RichfieId Co., 435 U.S. 151 , 157 ( 1978 ) , or 
when enforcement of state regulations would 
impair "federal superintendence of the 
field," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. 
v* Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963), our 
analysis has included "due regard for the 
presuppositions of our embracing federal 
system, including the principle of diffusion 
of power not as a matter of doctrinaire 
localism but as a promoter of democracy."
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959). Such concerns are 
not implicated in the same fashion when the 
question is whether federal statutory or 
federal common law governs, and accordingly 
the same sort of evidence of a clear and 
manifest purpose is not required. Indeed, as 
noted, in cases such as the present "we start 
with the assumption" that it is for Congress 
not federal courts, to articulate the 
appropriate standards to be applied as a 
matter of federal law. (Milwaukee II, supra, 
451 U.S. at 316-317, footnote O'itted.)
The Court's general comparison did not expressly address the 
possibility that state common law may survive its conclusion 
preemption of federal common law by the federal legislation, 
dissent, however, did:
By eliminating the federal common law of 
nuisance in this area, the Court in effect is 
encouraging recourse to state law whenever 
the federal statutory scheme is perceived to 
offer inadequate protection against pollution 
from outside the State, either in its 
enforcement standards or in the remedies 
afforded. This recourse is now inevitable 
under a statutory scheme that accords a 
significant role to state as well as federal 
law. But in the present context it is also 
unfortunate, since it undermines the Court's 
prior conclusion that it is federal rather 
than state law that should govern the 
regulation of interstate water pollution.
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S., at 102.
Instead of promoting a more uniform federal 
approach to the problem of alleviating 
interstate pollution, I fear that today's 
decision will lead States to turn to their 




assistance in filling the interstices of the 
federal statute. (451 U.S. at 353-354,
Blackmun, J. dissenting.)
It is unclear whether the dissent's characterization of the 
availability of state common law would be accepted by the Court 
if the issue were presented for decision. As indicated, the 
majority discussed it only to describe the relative ease of 
finding preemption of federal common law.
However, it is suggested that the very progression of pollution 
problem-solving discussed above--from state common law to federal 
common law to federal legislation--precludes reliance at this 
stage on the common law of the states relating to nuisance 
actions. Apparently, the impetus for the development of federal 
common law in this area was the inadequacy of differing concepts 
of state common law doctrines to deal with ambient pollutants. 
(See Texas v. Pankey, supra, 441 F .2d at 241.) As Milwaukee I 
suggested: "When we deal with air or water in their ambient or
interstate aspects, there is a federal common law" because of the 
"overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of 
decision . . . ." (Milwaukee I, supra, 406 U.S. at 103, 105, n. 
6; see Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).) In 
short, where federal concerns mandate the application of federal 
common law, state common law is superseded.
That analysis has lost none of its force ;y the Court's 
subsequent conclusion that federal legislition removed the need 
for federal common law. Rather, the congressional initiative 
presumably addressed the same problem of disparate state common 
law doctrines, but in a more uniform and comprehensive manner. 
Under the circumstances, it would appear that an attempt to 
revert to the earlier reliance upon state common law is unlikely 
to succeed.
Accordingly, on the basis of existing court decisions, 
substantial doubt exists as to the availability of federal or 
state common law actions for nuisance (or trespass) as means to 
protect NPS units from the adverse effects of air pollution 
generated outside those units.
CONCLUSION
Various laws may be utilized by the Department of the Interior to 
some extent to protect NPS units from the harmful effects of air 
pollution. None provides complete protection.
Some authorities seem better suited for the task than others. 
Other authorities may have been preempted by the Clean Air Act. 
That Act addresses the problem of air pollution in NPS units and 
elsewhere comprehensively, and affords the Secretary 
opportunities to participate in that protection.
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To a certain extent the effectiveness of existing law to deal 
with this problem will be determined case by case in the 
litigation process. Statutory mandates will have to be 
interpreted by the Secretary in the context of specific problems. 
Ultimately, those judgments will be tested and resolved in the 
courts, where the Justice Department is responsible for defending 
the interests of the United States. How those actions are 
prosecuted and defended will play a role in the development of 
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: House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 
: American Law Division
SUBJECT : Comments on Department of the Interior Memorandum of September, 
20, 1985 Entitled "Protection of National Park System Units 
from the Adverse Effects of Air Pollution"
You have asked for CRS review of the above-captioned memorandum regarding 
the Department of the Interior's authority under existing law to protect air 
quality in National Park System (NPS) units. The memorandum concludes that 
"[v]arious laws may be utilized by the Department of the Interior to some ex­
tent to protect NPS units from the harmful effects of air pollution. None 
provides complete protection." Laws discussed in the memorandum consist of 
the Clean Air Act (especially prevention of significant deterioration and 
visibility protection), National Park Service Organic Act, constitutional 
property power, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, and federal and 
state common law.
Our response to the Interior memorandum takes the form of selected 
comments rather than exhaustive, polnt-by-point evaluation. ALD attorneys 
contributing to this memorandum were Robert Meltz (Clean Air Act), PameLa 
Baldwin (National Park Service Organic Act and other park management au­
thorities), and George Costello (common law).
CRS-2
Clean Air Act
The Interior memorandum quite appropriately notes the statutory 
limits in the Clean Air Act's (CAA) program tor protecting air quality in 
the national parks. To recapitulate, limits in the prevention of signifi­
cant deterioration (PSD) system include the following.
1. It is restricted to only two pollutants: particulates and 
sulfur dioxide. EPA has ignored the express requirement 
in CAA section 166 that PSD regulations be promulgated for 
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, ozone, and nitrogen oxides 
by 1979, and for lead bv 1980.
2. No NPS units created after August 7, 1977, can be 
"mandatory class I". Such units will start out as 
Class II, and, if they do not meet the criteria
in CAA section 164(a) (1)-(2 ), can be downgraded by 
states to Class III. NPS units that can be 
downgraded to Class III include 224 out of the total 
337 units. (In fact, however, the redesignation pro­
cess has rarely been used.)
3. Federal land managers play only an advisory role in 
redesignation; states mav act independently of and 
inconsistently with the federal recommendation. J_/
4. The PSD system confers no relief from the emissions 
of existing sources —  i.e., those in existence 
before the first application for a PSD permit in
the area is received from a "major emitting facility."
A facility must emit a considerable amount of pol­
lution (100 tons/yr, or 250 tons/yr, depending 
on the source) before it is deemed "major."
5. The "affirmative responsibility" imposed on the Secretary 
of the Interior to protect "air-nualitv related values” is 
limited to Class I areas. Yet Class II areas, notes the 
Interior memorandum, "comprise the bulk of NPS units." 
Moreover, the process through which this responsibility is 
to be exercised —  part of the review of applications for 
construction permits, submitted for proposed major emitting 
facilities seeking to locate in PSD areas —  is a cumbersome,
\_/ CAA § 164(b)(2). See Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Dep't of the I n t e r i o r ,  
709 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1983).
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highly complex one and is unlikely to be invoked often. A 
state governor may grant variances from maximum allowable 
increases of S02 concentrations, despite the opposition of 
the Secretary, if the President finds the variance to be 
in the national interest.
6. The preconstruction review process noted in the preceding 
paragraph does not even apply if the proposed source's 
site is not within a PSD area, even if the NPS unit it 
might adversely affect is within a PSD area. 2/
7. The visibility protection scheme in the CAA is limited to 
mandatory class I areas (48 out of the total 337 units
in the NPS), and the Secretary of the Interior is given 
solely an advisory function.
/ In sum, the PSD tools conferred by the CAA for protection of NPS 
air quality are confined to only certain NPS units, to certain pollutants.
and to certain emission sources proposed for certain locations.
Even where the Secretary of the Interior's PSD authorities do come 
into play, the Act does not specify what, if any, enforcement tools the 
Secretary possesses. For example, could the Secretary sue to invalidate 
a state permit for construction of a ma^or emitting facility, granted on 
the basis of a questionable determination by the state that the proposed 
source will not cause concentrations exceeding the maximum allowable 
increases? The Act is silent on such questions, providing an explicit 
enforcement role only for EPA, the states, and citizens (per the citizen 
suit provision).
It is an interesting question, apparently as yet undecided, whether 
the Department of the Interior could use the citizen-suit provision
2/ Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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in the CAA as authority to enforce the Act's PSD requirements, or indeed 
to enforce any emission limitations imposed on sources under state implemen­
tation plans. A literal reading of the provision does suggest its avail­
ability —  any "person" may bring a citizen suit, and the Department is in-
4/
eluded within the CAA's definition of "person." Yet a court could well
5/
interpret the key enforcement section of the CAA, which speaks of enforce­
ment only by EPA, as reflecting a congressional intent that EPA be the 
sole voice of the federal government in matters of CAA enforcement.
Where the threat to national-park air aualitv stems from pollution 
sources that are (a) numerous, and (b) out-of-state, the CAA provides no 
effective mechanisr for forcing abatement of emissions from such sources.
Section 110(a)(2)(E) does require state plans to —
•
prohibit any stationary source within the State 
from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which 
will (I) prevent attainment or maintenance by any 
other State of any ... national ... ambient air 
quality standard, or (II) interfere with [required 
PSD measures in the downwind State's implementation 
plan].
V
However, the language of this provision, with its focus on individual sources, 
suggests the difficulty of invoking it to deal with regionwide pollution 
sources. The principal interstate-pollution provision in the CAA, 
section 126, is also geared to threats from individual out-of-state
V  CAA § 304.
4J CAA § 302(e). 
5/ CAA § 113.
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sources, a fact attested to by the failure to date of efforts to use sec­
tion 126 for abatement of regional emissions causing acid rain. In any 
event, section 126 can be Invoked only by states and their political sub­
divisions, not federal agencies, and only for ensuring maintenance of ambient 
standards, not PSD increments.
There is, finally, an inherent tension in the institutional arrangement 
created by the CAA. In the realm of air quality, the federal agency special­
ly charged with protecting the national parks (Interior) has, for the most 
part, only a consultative role. The federal agency with all the enforcement 
authority (EPA) has a broad spectrum of air-quality concerns, of which nation­
al-park air quality is but one. States, too, have their own priorities and 
economic needs, with which national-park air quality must often compete. In­
deed, which PSD areas should be mandatory class I, whether states should have 
sole redesignation authority, etc., were issues closely watched by states during 
enactment of the 1977 CAA amendments.
National Park Service Organic Act and Other Park 
Management Authorities
Congress created the National Park Service in 1916 to promote and reg­
ulate the parks "by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental 
purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations, which nurnose is 
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild 
life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjovment of future
6 /
generations."
6J Act of August 25, 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535, as amended; 16 U.S.C. 
§ l et seq.
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The General Authorities Act of 1970 articulated some of the values for 
which units were added to the NPS, defined the system, and clarified certain 
park management authorities. As will be discussed further in the part of 
this memorandum on common law actions, it is a well-established principle 
that the United States may bring suit to protect its property, in much the 
same way as any other property owner can. This authority seems to have 
been implicit in the park laws since the purposes of parks were set out 
in 1916. In 1978, Congress amended the 1970 Act by elaborating further 
on the management of the NPS in language that expressly mentioned protecting 
System lands:
Congress further reaffirms, declares, and 
directs that the promotion and regulation of the 
various areas of the National Park System, as 
defined in section 2 of this Act, shall be con­
sistent with and founded in the purpose estab­
lished by the first section of the Act of August 
25, 1916, to the common benefit of all the people 
of the United States. The authorization of ac­
tivities shall be construed and the protection, 
management, and administration of these areas 
shall be conducted in light of the high public 
value and integrity of the National Park System 
and shall not be exercised in derogation of 
the values and purposes for which these various 
areas have been established, except as mav have 
been or shall be directly and specifically pro­
vided by Congress.
The intent and necessity for this language has generated controversy. The 
language was part of legislation that was primarily designed to provide greater 
protection to the Redwood National Park in California. That park had been es-
U  Pub' Law 91-383, 84 Stat. 825.
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tablished In 1968, but logging activities on lands outside the park but within 
the same watershed were threatening the trees within the park.
The 1968 legislation establishing the park had authorized the Secretary 
to acquire Interests in lands by donation, or to "enter into contracts and co­
operative agreements with owners of land on the periphery of the park and on 
watersheds tributary to streams within the park designed to assure that the 
consequences of forestry management, timbering, land use, and soil conservation
practices conducted thereon, or of the lack of such practices, will not adversely
9/
affect the timber, soil, and streams within the park as aforesaid." The new
park was to be managed in accordance with the 1916 legislation. However, these
measures did not prove adeauate to protect the redwoods from the erosion and
sedimentation that resulted from timbering on lands within the watershed of the
%
park, the Secretary of the Interior did not undertake any other actions, and 
hence Congress considered various means to secure greater protection.
H.R. 3813 was introduced on February 22, 1977. The bill as reported with 
amendment by the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reflected the 
proposed draft submitted by the administration that strengthened the authority 
of the Secretary in several significant respects. In addition to including ad- 
ditonal acreage within the Redwood National Park, the bill also expanded the 
authority of the Secretary to enter into contracts and cooperative agreements 
with landowners and other entities outside the park. Section 1(a)(6) authorized 
the Secretary to review state regulatory provisions applicable to zones critical
8/
8/ Pub. Law 90-545, 82 Stat. 931.
9/ Id. § 3(e)
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to protection of the Park and, if they were insufficient, directly regulate 
the use of the lands: "the Secretary is authorized to promulgate and enforce
reasonable regulations of and restrictions on harvesting of timber and land 
rehabilitation and management practices within such zones, necessary to pro­
vide continuing protection to the lands and other resources within the park
Furthermore: "The Secretary is further directed to request the Attorney
General of the United States to initiate an action for injunctive relief to 
prohibit any violation or anticipated violation of regulations adopted here­
under or to otherwise require the rehabilitation of privately owned lands or 
to require other land use practices necessary for the protection of the in­
terests of the United States through action of law. Such an action will lie 
upon a showing of present or likely damage to established park resources with 
out regard to any other provision of law or standard of conduct."
Section 1(b) contained the language amending the 1970 Act, regarding 
protection of the parks.
In sum, the bill contained three devices by which activities on private 
lands outside the park boundaries might be controlled: zones within which
the Secretary could regulate; authority for suits to enforce any such reg­
ulations ££_ "to otherwise require the rehabilitation of privately ownea lands 
or co require other land use practices necessary for the protection of the 
interests of the United States"; and authority (in the new language amending 
the 1970 Act) for actions to "protect" parks.
The transboundary effects of the regulatory zones and judicial actions 
to enforce such regulations are express and clear. The transboundary effects
C R S - 9
of authorizing suits to abate or control land use practices on private land 
even aside from the existence of an express federal regulatory program also 
is expressly stated, but the underlying reasoning in support of the provisions 
would certainly be of interest as the express stating of authority for such 
suits was definitely noteworthy.
The intended transboundary applicability of the 1978 amendment of the 1970 
Act is not clear on its face. The language could have been intended only to 
guide actions of the Secretary within parks —  perhaps to emphasize that ac­
tivities to ‘'promote" the parks under the 1916 Act must also always be pro­
tective of park values and purposes. It could also possibly apply to all ac­
tions of the Secretary in his capacity as the administrator responsible for 
management of the NPS, and in his other capacities relating to federal lands 
(e.g., as administrator of the federal mineral-leasing program). It could also 
refer to actions of the Secretary and of all federal entities. It could also 
refer to protective actions of the Secretary to be taken even as to activities 
on nonfederal lands that threatened NPS units.
The House committee report focused primarily on the new authority to reg­
ulate private lands within the critical zones, and indicated that these pro­
visions had been approved by both the Solicitor's Office at the Department of
JO/
the Interior and the Department of Justice. This legal analysis is not avail­
able to us at this time. The report further notes that "a similar approach has 
previously been adopted bv the Congress with regard to fires on areas surround­
ing National Forest lands; with regard to mining in various National Park Ser-
10/ H.R. Report 581, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 25-26 (1977).
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vice areas; and, with regard to surface mining activities on certain private |
lands. "It is with this background that the Committee adopted the regulatory
J_1V
provisions in H.R. 3813.
The regulatorv provisions were those submitted by the Administration. In 
its report on the proposal, the Department of the Interior related the provisions 
authorizing the Secretary to request the Attorney General to seek injunctive re­
lief only to violations of the Secretary's regulations in the special zones.
The report did not comment on the remainder of the broad suit provisions.
As to the regulatory authority, the report stated: "We do not however, view
such authority as setting a precedent for Federal Regvilation of private lands
U!
adjacent to ocher parks in the absence of equally exceptional circumstances."
The report did not illuminate whether the amendment to the 1970 
Act was intended to have transboundarv effects, saying only:
The proposed legislation also provides 
for an amendment to the General Authorities 
Act of 1970 to further define the Secretary 
of the Interior's duties and limitations with 
regard to the administration of the National 
Park System. This provision provides that 
the protection, management and administration 
of the various areas of the system, as pre- 
viouslv defined, must be consistent with those 
high purposes originally established by Con­
gress with the creation of the National Park 
Service in 191b. While this standard of 
decisionmaking should be self evident, we 
feel that the continued pressure upon the 
National Park Svstem todav makes a restate­
ment and reenforcement of these basic prem­
ises very appropriate. 13/
JJ_/ Id. at 27
12/ Ld. at 33
13/ Id.
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When che legislation was considered on che floor, an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute became the focus of the debate. Congressman Philip 
Burton, a sponsor and member of the Commitcee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
noted that the provisions for regulatory authoritv had been deleted in the 
substitute:
More particularly, if the members of the com­
mittee will recall, the subcommittee bill carried 
a provision for regulatory authority, which I 
thought was justified given the circumstances.
Along with that regulatory authority went certain 
injunctive authority for the Attorney General and 
other collateral legal tools. The Senate, in 
facing this matter, decided that the potential 
risk of the precedent perhaps outweighed the jus­
tification of this proposal. So, the Senate, in 
adopting the same basic 48,000-acre design that 
che house develooed —  chat was also che design 
of the administration —  substituted for the reg- 
ulatorv authority certain abilities of the Sec­
retary to acquire land in a 30,000 acre park 
protection zone, and as a result then drooped 
the variety of legal tools that the House committee 
recommended in its bill.
It appeared to me chat this compromise achieved 
essentially the protection of the Redwood Creek 
Basin . . . .  Because we can achieve an equivalent 
result, I thought it wise to accept the Senate views, 
with a refinement, in that respect. 14/
It is interesting to note chat in his remarks, Rep. Burton linked the 
authorization of injunctive suits with che authoritv of the Secretary to have 
promulgated regulations controlling uses on private lands within the designated
14/ 124 Cong. Rec. 2910 (1978) (emphasis added).
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zones even though the language was not so limited and the provision amending
the 1970 Act was retained. The Congressman's remarks may imply, therefore, that 
an ability to enjoin activities on private lands is not intended to be conferred 
by the 1970 Act amendment language. On the other hand, perhaps his remarks re­
ferred only to that part of the injunction language that was related to the reg­
ulatory authority, and were not addressed to the rest of the language; language 
that perhaps was seen as merely restating the existing authority of the Secretary.
The remainder of the House debate did not return to these issues.
The Senate version, S. 1976, was introduced on August 1, 1977 by Senator 
Cranston. As introduced, the Senate bill also initially reflected the suggestions 
of the Department of Interior.
In setting out the original administration-suggested provisions af­
fecting private lands, Sen. Cranston said:
Furthermore, the bill enhances the authority I
of the Secretary to protect the resource value of 
Redwood National Park by authorizing him to carry 
out a land rehabilitation program on lands upstream 
and adjacent to the park. Contracts or cooperative 
agreements would be authorized to initiate, develop, 
and implement such a program on lands contributing 
significant sedimentation because of past land use 
practices and to reduce risk of further damage to 
streamside areas adjacent to Redwood Creek. The 
Secretary is also authorized to establish zones 
where regulations are needed to protect the park 
resources from activities and interference occur­
ring on non-Federal lands, and to enforce reason­
able timber harvesting, land rehabilitation, and 
management practices where the existing State of 
California regulations are found insufficient to 
achieve the necessary protection. Secretarv Andrus, 
in his transmittal letter to the Congress, noted 
in this regard that these steps were considered 
necessary because of the extraordinarily fragile 




larly the Tall Trees Grove. The Secretary fur­
ther noted, however, that this grant of author­
ity would not be viewed as establishing a pre­
cedent for Federal regulation of private lands 
adjacent to other parks in the absence of equal­
ly exceptional circumstances. 15/
The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, to whom the bill was referred 
deleted the provisions on the regulatory zones, and injunctions, but retained the 
language amending the 1970 Act. The committee report notes that the regulatory 
authority was a "new approach" and that authority for the Secretary to acquire 
additional lands in a critical zone if harmful uses were occurring would better 
solve the problem. However, the Committee report also seemed to indicate that 
the reiteration of the high value of National Park lands contained in the 
amendment to the 1970 Act could serve as a basis for judicial intervention 
in uses of private lands detrimental to parks:
It is the sense of the committee that there 
will be a continuing need to protect the expanded 
Redwood National Park from actions on private lands 
located within the same ecological units as che 
park.
In part this need can be met by che exercise 
of the authorities provided by existing seccion 3(e) 
of the 1968 Act. The Committee intends that che au­
thorities provided therein will he exercised as nec­
essary to protect the park.
In part, this need can also be met by the ini­
tiation of legal action against activities chat 
threaten the park . . . .
15/ 123 Cong. Rec. 25847 (1977).
CRS-14
In this regard, the committee strongly endorses 
the Administration's proposed amendment to the Act 
of August 18, 1970, concerning the management of the 
National Park System, to refocus and insure that the 
basis for decisionmaking concerning the System con­
tinues to be the criteria provided by 16 U.S.C. § 1 
—  that is . . . [report quotes lc] This restate­
ment of these highest principles of management is 
also intended to serve as the basis for any ju­
dicial resolution of competing private and public 
values and interests in the areas surrounding Red­
wood National Park and other areas of the National
Park Svstem.* -  — -
The committee recognizes, however, that neither 
section 3(e) nor legal action have been totally suc­
cessful in protecting park resources. It also rec­
ognizes that Secretary Andrus has strongly testified 
that the acquisition of the additional 48,000 acres 
will not, by itself, protect these expanded park re­
sources. The administration proposed a standbv reg­
ulation approach to this problem. It is the sense 
of this Committee that the situation at Redwood Na­
tional Park is one where a standby .acquisition, or 
protection, zone is more appropriate.
The regulation concept is recognized to be a 
new approach to these adjacent land type problems 
for National Park Service areas. We believe the 
problems at Redwood National Park are too urgent 
to place reliance on such a new concept.
Accordingly, the committee has deleted the 
regulation provisions of S. 1976 and, in lieu 
thereof, has substituted a "Park Protection 
Zone" . . . .  16/
In the section-by-section analysis of the report, it again is noted that 
the committee deleted the provisions requested bv the administration for stand­
by regulatory authority in favor of standby acquisition authority as set forth 
in the explanation on committee amendment 2.
16/ Sen. Report No. 528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977) (emphasis added).
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In discussing the amendment to the Act of 1970, the report Indicates that 
the committee was concerned that:
Litigation with regard to Redwood National 
Park and other areas of the system mav have 
blurred the responsibilities articulated by 
the 1916 Act creating the National Park Service.
Accordingly, this provision suggested by the 
administration would appear to be particularly ap­
propriate. The Secretary is to afford the highest 
standard of protection and care to the natural re­
sources within Redwood National Park and the Na­
tional Park System. No decision shall compromise 
these resource values except as Congress may have 
specifically provided. 17/
In explaining the committee's deletion of the regulatory authoritv and 
the addition of new acquisition authority, Sen. Abourezk stated: "I believe
the Secretary possesses sufficient authoritv to protect our national parks under 
current law. I urge the Secretary to use the acquisition authority in the park 
protection zone iudiciouslv. If retained in the final bill, I would say the
content is clear that the authority given is not a regulatorv club, but rather
18/
a last resort to prevent physical damage to park resources."
This explanation is somewhat contradictory in that if the current law 
provides sufficient authority for the Secretarv to protect our national parks 
hv somehow abating harmful actions on private lands, it is difficult to see 
why the power to condemn those lands was necessary. nr, if condemnation au­
thoritv was necessary because it was not the po1icy of the federal government
17/ Id. at 14.
18/ 124 Cong. Rec. 1563 (1978).
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to control uses of private lands, then it Is difficult to understand in what 
way current law, lacking as it does specific management directives, is suf­
ficient to protect the parks. The floor discussions do not shed further light 
on the understanding of how current authority and the new language amending 
the 1970 Act related to the Secretary's ability to protect the parks from 
activities on private lands outside park boundaries.
I V
The conference report provides no additional clarification.
On balance, although the issue is not free from ambiguity, it appears 
the 1978 Amendment of the 1970 Act was intended to clarify that the values 
and purposes for which the NPS System was established’were intended to pro­
vide the basis for their management and protection, including protection 
from external threats. This was undoubtedly implicit in the 1916 and 1970 
acts. Therefore, when Congress reiterated that the "high public value” of 
these lands should guide all activities associated with their management 
and protection, Congress arguably was attempting to nrod the Secretary 
into more vigorous action. The references in the legislative history to 
the adequacy of current law and to the indications of "blurred responsi­
bility" revealed by the Redwood National Park (RNP) litigation (discussed 
below) appear to indicate that the intent may have been to precipitate 
more suits to protect the parks from harmful outside activities. This 
interpretation is quite harmonious with the deletion of the express au­
thority for the Secretary to directly regulate private lands outside the
] V  H*R* Report 931, 9Sth Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1978).
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parks and to sue for enforcement of such regulation. Congress could have 
considered the indirect control of private land use through judicial in­
junction of harmful practices much more acceptable in chat in the latter 
situation the federal government would be acting much as any other landowner. 
Given the reluctance of the Department to pursue such actions in the past, 
one may question the adequacy of che spare and general language chosen. 
However, the sufficiency of che language is an issue separate from its 
intent.
In the litigation surrounding the RNP that was referenced in the leg­
islative history of the 1978 Act, environmental groups had filed suit to 
compel the Secretary to take action to protect the Park from harmful logging
activities on nearby lands. In three stages of the same case, the federal
%
district court for the northern district of California found the Secretary's
20 /
performance of his duties to manage the NPS to be judicially reviewable, that
2J_/
he had failed to carry out those duties, but that ultimately he had complied
22/
with the order of the court to do so.
In its discussion of the three stages of the litigation that preceded 
che 1978 legislation, the Interior memorandum makes several statements as 
to the reasoning and conclusions reached by che court chat do not appear 
warranted from che cases.
20/ Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
11/ 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
22/ 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
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The Interior memorandum at 14-15 correctly notes that in case 1, the 
court cited both the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 and the RNP 
Act as empowering the Secretary to protect the Park, but focused on the RNP 
Act to discern specifically enforceable duties. At trial in the second case, 
the memorandum at 15 states that "while once again citing both the Organic 
Act and the RNP Act in support of its general conclusion, the court’s order 
setting forth the specific ’reasonable steps’ that the Secretary might be 
obliged to take within a reasonable time to acauit his statutory responsibil­
ities included only those actions identified in the 'unique' Redwood park 
enabling legislation . . . Yet the court's opinion makes it clear that the
Secretary should exercise all powers vested in him by law, and particularly 
those detailed in the RNP Act; and that he should perform all the duties im­
posed by law including in particular those specific ones set out in the RNP 
23/
Act —  a very different emphasis. Perhaps the court was merely indicating, 
and properly so, that it would not speculate as to the precise nature of the 
actions the Secretary might be obligated to take under the general statute 
if the Secretary also had failed to carry out specifically enumerated stat­
utory duties.
Similarly, the Interior memorandum at 16 indicates that in stating that 
the Secretary might seek clarification of the situation from Congress, the 
court had implicitly acknowledged that additional Congressional action 
would be necessary before the Secretary would be empowered, to do anything 
to that end not specified in the Redwood legislation." As to the third 
case, the memorandum states at 16 that because the Secretary "had neither
23/ 398 F. Supp. at 293 (emphasis added).
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funds nor authority to take the other actions proposed by the court in its 
second opinion —  the court purged the Secretary of his previously found 
failure . . . .  Thus it would seem clear that the Redwood cases did not sup- 
oort the notion that the Organic Act endows the Secretary with extensive 
extra-territorial jurisdiction which would allow him to protect NPS units 
from threats originating on lands without them. To the contrary, the clear 
implication ot these cases is that the Secretary's extra-territorial power 
is limited to that expressly identified by Congress.” (Emphasis added.)
This conclusion does not necessarily follow from a reading of the cases 
in auestion, which in fact indicate the contrary. At the time of the second 
case, the Secretary was supported by the general park management authorities 
and the specifics of the RNP Act, which at that time authorized him to modify 
the boundaries of the Park and negotiate agreements with the logging companies. 
Neither of the latter efforts was productive, in part because of lack of effort 
by the Secretary and in part because of lack of funds. No actions had been 
taken to attempt to carry out the general duties of the Secretary. By the 
time of the third case, it was quite clear that the Secretary had at­
tempted to reach agreements with the timber companies and that those ef­
forts had failed because the companies had not cooperated. It was also 
clear, however, that the Secretary had undertaken other measures that 
could only be under his general authorities to accomplish park purposes 
in general and those of the RNP in particular. The Secretary had, for 
example, recommended alternative courses ot action that required addition­
al funding, which OMB had declined to request, and which therefore the Secre­
tary could not implement. Interior also indicated it requested new addition­
al regulatory power over peripheral timber operations to solve the problem of
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the logging activities without additional federal monies. There is a sig­
nificant difference between requesting legislation because one lacks authoritv 
altogether and requesting legislation because one lacks the funds to carry out 
existing authority. The third case also indicates that Interior had by that 
time recommended to the Justice Department that litigation be instituted to
restrain peripheral timber practices which imminently endanger the Park, a
25/
24/
recommendation that was "under consideration." There was no elaboration as 
to the nature of the suits recommended, but since the Secretary had so few 
specific powers under the RNP Act, it appears reasonable to assume that such 
suits would be based on his more general management and protection duties under 
either the RNP Act or the 1916 and 1970 Acts. In either case, the Secretary 
was not returning to Congress because he was powerless to act at all under 
current authorities, but rather because certain of the actions he by then 
sought to pursue were stymied for other reasons, e.g., that litigation on 
behalf of the Department is conducted through the Justice Department, which 
may or may not proceed.
Therefore, it is not clear that the Redwood cases do not support the 
notion that the Organic Act endows the Secretary with some extra-territorial 
jurisdiction. That nower may not be "extensive", but the cases do not' in­
dicate that it is limited to that expressly identified by Congress. While 
the Secretary may not have authority to zone and directly regulate private 
lands uses of which are harmful to parks, he does appear to have both the 
duty and the power to seek judicial intervention to abate such uses.
2A/ A2A F. Supp. at 17A.
25/ Id.
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The Interior memorandum does correctly note that anocher district 
court has found the Secretary's duty to be quite clear and that that duty
could require the assertion of federal rights in judicial proceedings —
26/
for example, by bringing trespass or nuisance actions if appropriate.
Whether these common law causes of action would be available for relief from 
air pollution originating outside the parks is discussed in the following 
section.
Common Law
The Department of the Interior memorandum appropriately concludes that 
"substantial doubt exists as to the availability of federal or state com­
mon law actions . . .  as a means to protect NPS units from the adverse ef­
fects of air pollution generated outside those units." The memorandum also 
notes that different principles apply to application of federal common law 
as opposed to state common law. The argument that federal common law cannot 
apply is strong; app 1 icabi1ity of state common law is more open to dispute.
The Supreme Court's decisions in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois ("Milwaukee
27/
II") and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Associa- 
28/
t ion stand for the broad proposition that there is no room for application 
of federal common law to supplement remedies authorized by a comprehensive federal
26/ 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980).
27/ 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
28/ 453 U.S. I (1981).
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statutory scheme of regulation. The Supreme Court's rationale was that
ordinarily "it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the
29/
appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.*’ The 
question is whether Congress through the statute has addressed a problem, 
not whether the particular regulatory controls applied by the administering 
agency are deemed bv the court to be adequate. There can be little auestion 
that the PSD controls in the CAA address the problem of air auality in national
parks in a manner that defeats the argument that an "interstice" exists to be
30/
filled by federal common law. If, as Sea Clammers suggests, all that is re­
quired is that Congress has addressed "the area of (air) pollution" comprehen-
21/
sively, then the same conclusion would be drawn. Milwaukee II has been ap­
plied to hold that the CAA is so comprehensive as to preempt federal common 
32/
law remedies.
While there is a presumption that federal statutory law does preempt
federal common law, the presumption is that federal law does not preempt
state statutory or common law. As the Court in Miluaukee 11 expressed it,
the starting point for determining whether state law has been supplanted
by federal law is "the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest
23/
purpose of Congress."
29/ Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317.
12/ See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324-25 n. 18 (district court in ap­
plying federal common law "was not 'filling a gap' in the regulatory scheme, 
it was simply providing a different regulatory scheme").
21/ See 453 U.S. at 22.
22/ See United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982). 
33/ 451 U.S. at 316.
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Although case law is sparse, there may be reasons for not applying the 
presumption against preemption of state law in the context of the Secretary 
of the Interior's authority to protect national parks. One reason is that 
the rationale for the presumption may be inapposite. The question here is 
whether protection of federal land by federal officials falls within the pur­
view of the "historic police powers of the States" protected by the presumption. 
This is a moot point. It is also arguable that application of state law to in- 
state pollution (some air pollution affecting national parks has crossed state 
boundaries; some has not) may be preempted by federal law under rationales de­
veloped in the federal common law cases. Finally, there is a related argument 
that even if the air pollution in question is intrastate in origin, the fed­
eral interest in protecting the parks is such that a federal rather than a 
state rule of law should apply.
Support for these arguments that federal rather than state law should
apply can be found in a decision of a federal district court in United States
347
v. Outboard Marine Corp., dismissing a claim by the United States based on 
the state common law of products liability. The United States claimed that 
its sovereign interest in the nation's navigable waterways was injured by 
a PCB manufacturer's failure to warn purchasers of the dangers of spills 
into waterways. The district court determined that "a suit by the United 
States to protect navigable waterways from pollution reauires a federal rule 
of decisions under Mllwaukee I [Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)]
34/ 549 F. Supp. 10)2 (N.D. 111. 1982)
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and a statutory rule of decision under Milwaukee II.” When the Supreme Court 
authorized Illinois to pursue federal common law remedies in Milwaukee I. it 
cited both the nature of the action (water pollution) and the character of 
the parties. The district court in Outboard Marine reasoned that, while some 
water pollution cases might not require a federal rule of decision, "the fed­
eral interest is at its strongest [when] the United States is suing to protect
36/
its sovereign interest in the nation's waterways." Similarly, it might be 
argued that a federal rule of decision should be required when the United States 
is suing to protect its interest in public lands from air pollution.
There are several countervailing arguments relating to preemption of state 
law remedies. First, it can be argued that the United States, when acting as a 
property owner, should not be denied any remedies available to other property 
owners within a state. If property owners are permitted under state law to 
maintain nuisance or other common law actions to abate air pollution not con­
trolled by federal or state air pollution regulation, then the United States 
should also have this right. Secondly, there is the question of the Clean 
Air Act's relationship to the Park protection authorities noted above, viz., 
does the Clean Air Act limit the general statutory authority to protect 
national parks from external threats?
That the United States may sue in state courts under state law to protect
37/
its property is a well-established principle. See, e.g., Cotton v. United States,
3 5 /
35/ Id. at 1034-1035.
36/ Id. at 1034.
37/ 52 U.S . (11 How.) 232 (1850).
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holding chat Che United States could bring a trespass action in state court
for damages against someone who had unlawfully cut and removed timber from
public land. More recently, but before Milwaukee II, a federal district
court held that this proprietary right of the United States to sue to pro-
28/
tect its property was not eliminated by the Clean Air Act. The district 
court relied on the general principle that statutes will not be held to 
divest the sovereign of existing rights and remedies unless there is a 
clear expression or indication of intent to do so. A contrary intent, 
to preserve federal remedies, was found in CAA § 310, which provides that 
the Act "shall not be construed as superseding or limiting the authorities 
and responsibilities, under any other provision of law . . . of . . . any 
other Federal officer.” While this case did not distinguish between fed­
eral and state common law, it is arguable that its rationale is still valid 
as applied to federal utilization of state law remedies.
As discussed above, the general park protection authorities have been in­
terpreted as including the discretion to bring "trespass or nuisance actions
39/
if appropriate." It is arguable that application of Milwaukee II principles
to the air pollution context would not affect whatever authority exists to uti­
lize state common law trespass and nuisance actions as a means of exercisine 
this broad authority to protect the parks. Looked at in this light, the issue 
is whether the Clean Air Act circumscribes the general park protection authority
18/ United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Mont. 
1979).
39/ Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 448 (D.D.C. 1980).
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in the field of air pollution, and not whether strictly common law remedies 
have been preempted.
Because park protection language was strengthened in 1978, the 1977 Clean 
Air Act Amendments, containing the PSD protections for parks in Part C, cannot 
be said to have repealed by implication the 1978 changes. Any such argument 
would have to establish that the 1977 CAA repealed by implication the then- 
existing park protection authority (to the extent that it might go beyond PSD 
regulation), and that the 1978 amendments, although general, did not change the 
status quo with respect to air pollution. Repeals by implication are disfavored, 
CAA Part C is silent as to relationship to other federal laws, and CAA § 310, 
supra, suggests that other federal remedies are preserved. Nonetheless, there 
must be some doubt as to whether the very general park protection authority may 
be invoked to extend regulation beyond what is permitted by Part C, a regulatory 
scheme addressing the specific problem of damage to public lands by air pollution. 
There is a possible analogy to Sea Clampers, surra, where the Court closed the 
door tightly not just on federal common law actions, but also on the alternative 
remedies sought under the civil rights laws (42 D.S.C. § 1983) and under the theorv 
of implied rights of action.
If application of state law is not precluded bv the nature of the action 
(by application of Milwaukee I and Outboard Marine principles) and if no "clear
and manifest congressional purpose to preempt can be found, there would still
C R S - 2 7
be che question of whether state law (common or statutory) would permit 
imposition of controls stricter than those required by the Clean Air Act.
And there is the additional question of whether a state would permit com­
mon-law remedies to supplement remedies available under its air pollution
control statute. What rule individual states would apply in these situations
40/
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40/ Committee staff have informed us that air pollution problems exist in NPS 
units located in at least four states. Staff has asked that we determine whether 
state common-law remedies for air pollution appear to be preserved in those states in 
the face of state statutory programs dealing with air pollution, with particular ref­
erence to claims of the Department of the Interior.
All four states have included in their air pollution statutes a savings 
clause that seems to preserve common-law remedies. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 
41509(d); Me. Rev. Scat. Ann. tit. 38, § 581; Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-25-114; Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 70.94.370. The cited provisions appear in each case to reach com­
mon-law actions brought by federal agencies. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 39047 
(e); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 582.9; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.94.030(3).
Thus, whatever common-law rights are afforded Che Department of che Interior in 
these states would appear unimpaired by state statutory efforts co control air pol- 
lut ion.
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SUBJECT: Legal Authority of the Secretary to Protect the Air
Quality and Related Values of NPS Units from Adverse 
Impacts of Surface Coal Mining Activities
You have requested our opinion on the existing legal authority of 
the Secretary of the Interior to protect the air quality and 
related values of National Park System (NPS) units from adverse 
impacts of surface coal mining activities. Your request was made 
in the context of this Department's forthcoming comments on a 
rule proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on 
October 26, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 43211, which would list surface 
coal mining operations as "major" stationary sources of air 
pollution subject to review under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
7475(a). We understand that this opinion will be used by the 
Department to evaluate whether the existing authority of the 
Secretary is adequate to protect NPS units, or if the additional 
protection embodied in the rule proposed by EPA is appropriate.
Summary Conclusion
Generally, the Secretary has considerable existing authority to 
protect the air quality and related values of N P S  units from 
adverse impacts of surface coal mining activities. This author­
ity appears in a number of Federal statutes and regulations. The 
applicability of any one of these statutes or regulations to a 
particular situation depends on where the coal is located, 
whether it is federally or privately owned, and if federally 
owned, whether or not it is leased. The following analysis first 
describes the authority that applies uniquely to federally-owned 
coal, and then the authority that applies regardless of coal 
ownersh i p .
I . Federally-Owned Coal Under the Mineral Leasing Act and the 
Federal Coal Program
With respect to federally-owned coal, the Mineral Leasing Act of 
1920 (MLA), as amended, 30 U.S.C. 181 et: seg. (1982 ), protects
^PS units whenever mining is contemplated. The MLA provides that 
no federally-owned coal may be mined unless authorized by the
Department of the Interior. Different provisions of the MLA 
apply to those Federal coal resources inside and to those outside 
of the National Park System.
Under the MLA the leasing of Federal coal within national parks 
and monuments is prohibited. 30 U.S.C. 181 and 352. Section 16 
of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
1092, extends this prohibition further to "any area of the 
National Park System."
Outside the National Park System a decision to offer Federal coal 
for leasing is entirely discretionary. 30 U.S.C. 201(a)(1).
The Department may decline to offer an area for lease in order to 
avoid unacceptable adverse impacts to NPS units. See: Duesinq
v. Udall, 350 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 383 
U.S. 912 (1966). The Federal coal program administered by the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is the mechanism by which the 
Department exercises this discretion.
Before an area is offered for leasing under the Federal coal 
program it is evaluated at two distinct stages--first through the 
land use planning process, and then through tract selection and 
the development of lease stipulations. And once a lease is 
issued the Department retains substantial authority to impose 
conditions on the approval of the operation and reclamation plan. 
At each of these stages there are safeguards designed to identify 
and either mitigate or avoid unacceptable adverse impacts on 
resources in the area, including air quality impacts on NPS 
units.
A. Land Use Planning
During the land use planning process all Federal coal deposits in 
a planning area are evaluated to identify those which are 
unacceptable for further consideration for leasing. Two steps in 
this process that are relevant to protecting the air quality and 
related values of NPS units are the application of unsuitability 
criteria and multiple land use decisions.
1. Unsuitability Criteria
Areas that are determined to have Federal coal development poten­
tial may be eliminated from further consideration for leasing 
through the application of established unsuitability criteria.
43 CFR 3461.1. Under Criterion Number 1, all Federal coal within 
units of the National Park System is considered unsuitable for 
leasing. 43 CFP 3461.1(a)(1).
Although no specific criterion exists for air quality, protection 
from the adverse effects of fugitive emissions is provided to NPS 
units through visual resource management analysis (VRM) under 
unsuitability Criterion Number 5. 43 C.F.R. 3461.1(e)(1). Class
1 VRM areas, which are of outstanding scenic quality or high 
visual sensitivity, are considered unsuitable for leasing unless 
the surface management agency (i.e., BLM for Federal coal outside
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park system boundaries) determines that surface r©«1 mining 
operations will not significantly diminish <̂l adversely affect 
the scenic quality of the area. Thu«=' the proposed EPA rule 
addresses the snme concerns already considered by the Department 
for Class I VRM areas.
2. Multiple Land Use Decisions
In addition to application of the unsuitability criteria, Federal 
coal deposits may be eliminated from further consideration for 
leasing through multiple land use decisions. 43 CFR 3420.1- 
4(e)(3). This procedure is available to protect resource values 
of a locally important or unique nature that are not included in 
the unsuitability criteria. Areas evaluated for multiple land 
use decisions are subjected to conflict analysis which is based 
on resource information and potential use. As a result of this 
process a Federal coal deposit may be excluded from further 
consideration for leasing due to conflict with other resource 
uses, including potential air quality impacts. In addition, the 
land use plan may consider critical threshold levels as a basis 
for limiting lands available for further consideration of coal 
leasing.
During the 1985 review of the Federal coal management program, 
potential air quality effects on NPS units generated considerable 
discussion. In his February 1986 decisions on the program, the 
Secretary directed- BLM to propose two rule changes to improve the 
consideration of these effects in the leasing process. One of 
these changes would give special emphasis to certain resources, 
including air quality, during multiple use evaluation. The other 
change would strengthen consultation between BLM and any other 
affected surface managing agencies, and particularly the National 
Park Service, during the land use planning process in order to 
insure that the purposes and values of concern to these agencies 
were considered and incorporated into land use decisions. In 
making these decisions, the Secretary emphasized that mitigation 
of impacts to lands administered by other agencies would not be 
affected by their lack of contiguity to BLM lands.
B. Tract Selection and Lease Stipulations
Even where land use pi 
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<?nvironmental impact of leasing each tract is analyzed. Depend­
ing on the significance of any impacts that are identified, a 
tract may be dropped from further consideration, the tract 
boundaries may be modified, or the ranking of the tract relative 
to others may be lowered.
Throughout this process BLM, in consultation with Federal and 
State agencies with appropriate expertise, may develop special 
lease stipulations to mitigate or avoid potential impacts. 43 CFR 
3420.4-2 and 3420.4-3(b). In addition, any coal lease that is 
issued must contain a provision requiring compliance by the 
lessee with the Clean Air Act. 30 U.S.C. 201(a)(3)(E). Thus, 
throughout the leasing process there is ample opportunity to 
consider and mitigate any potential air quality impacts on NPS 
units.
C . Authority to Condition the Operation and Reclamation 
Plan For Existing Leases
The MLA and corresponding rules also protect NPS units in areas 
for which Federal coal leases already exist. For all leases 
issued or readjusted after August 4, 1976, prior to taking any 
action on a leasehold which might cause significant disturbance 
to the environment, and not later than three years after the 
lease is issued or readjusted, the lessee must submit for 
approval by the Secretary of the Interior an operation and 
reclamation plan. 30 U.S.C. 207(c) (1982), and 43 CFR 3482.1(b). 
An operation and reclamation plan also must be filed and approved 
before an operator may begin coal mining on pre-August 4, 1976, 
leases which have not been readjusted. 43 C.F.R. 3482.1(b), 
issued in part under 30 U.S.C. 189.
As a component of a mining plan, the operation and reclamation 
plan is submitted to the Secretary for approval under 30 CFR Part 
746. The Secretary may approve or disapprove the mining plan, or 
give conditional approval to mitigate any adverse impacts which 
may result from mining, including impacts which could occur to 
NPS units from fugitive emissions. 30 CFR 746.14.
11 • Surface Mining Control And Reclamation Act of 1977
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA),
30 U.S.C. 1201 e_t seg. , protects NPS units from impacts on air 
quality and related values in five ways: (a) Section 522(e),
30 U.S.C. 1272(e), explicitly provides for the protection of 
parks; (b) section 522(c), 30 U.S.C. 1272(c), establishes an 
unsuitability petition process, under which any person who may be 
adversely affected can seek to have an area designated unsuitable 
for surface coal mining operations; (c) section 515(b)(4),
30 U.S.C. 1265(b)(4), contains an operator performance standard 
to control air pollution attendant to erosion; (d) section 
515(b)(17), 30 U.S.C. 1265(b)(17), insures that the construction, 
maintenance and postmining conditions of mine roads will control 
or prevent erosion and damage to public property; and (e) section
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508(a)(9), 30 U.S.C. 1258(a)(9), assures operator compliance at 
the permitting stage with the Clean Air Act and any other appli­
cable air quality-related laws and regulations.
A. Section 522(e)— Areas Proscribed by the Congress
Section 522(e) of SMCRA, which specifies areas where surface coal 
mining operations are not permitted, includes three subsections 
that apply directly to NPS units. Except for valid existing 
rights, as discussed below, no mining is permitted: (a) Within
the boundaries of NPS units, section 522(e)(1); (b) within a 300- 
foot buffer zone around NPS units, section 522(e)(5); or (c) 
which will adversely affect NPS units unless specifically 
authorized by the National Park Service, section 522(e)(3).
Specifically, section 522(e) of SMCRA provides that after August 
3, 1977, and subject to valid existing rights, no surface coal 
mining operations which did not exist on that date shall be 
permitted:
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of 
units of the National Park System, the 
National Wildlife Refuge System, the 
National System of Trails, the National 
Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild 
and Scenic Rivers System, including study 
rivers designated under section 5(a) of the 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and National 
Recreation Areas designated by Act of 
Congress;
(3) which will adversely affect any 
publicly owned park or places included in 
the National Register of Historic Sites 
unless approved jointly by the regulatory 
authority and the Federal, State, or local 
agency with jurisdiction over the park or 
the historic site; [and]
(5) . . . within three hundred feet of any
. . . public park . . . .
30 U.S.C. 1272(e) .
These provisions provide significant protection to NPS units from 
potential impacts on air quality and related values due to 
surface coal mining operations. Although of relatively limited 
geographic scope, sections 522(e)(1) and (e)(5) are clear and 
easy to apply. While section 522(e)(3) is somewhat more diffi­
cult to apply, it is limited neither by geography nor by the 
nature of the adverse effect.
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Provision for a determination of adverse effect under section 
522(e)(3) is included in the review process for a surface coal 
mining and reclamation permit application. Upon receipt of an 
application for operations that may affect an NPS unit, the SMCRA 
regulatory authority.!/ provides to the National- Park Service 
written notice and an opportunity to comment. 30 CFR 
773.13(a) ( 3) ( ii). Any such comments must be considered by the 
regulatory authority. 30 CFR 773.15(a). Unless the regulatory 
authority can find in writing that the proposed permit area is 
not subject to the limitations of section 522(e)(3), the 
application may not be approved. 30 CFR 773.15(c)(3)(ii) . Where 
the regulatory authority determines that the proposed operation 
would adversely affect an NPS unit— including impacts to air 
quality and related values— under 30 CFR 761.12(f)(1) it must 
request the approval or disapproval of the National Park Service 
before it can make the finding.
The protection afforded to NPS units by section 522(e) is quali­
fied somewhat by an exception for valid existing riyhts (VER). 
Although the existing Federal definition of VER at 30 CFR 761.5
(1984) was remanded as being promulgated without adequate oppor­
tunity for public notice and comment, In Re: Permanent Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation II, No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. 1935), the 
the State definitions of VER currently remain in force. These 
definitions, which apply on non-Federal and non-Indian lands, 
base VER in most instances on a permit applicant having made a 
good-faith effort to obtain all permits necessary for mining by 
August 3, 1977. This is a stringent test, which few applicants 
meet. The new Federal definition, which will be developed in 
consultation with the National Park Service, also is expected to 
provide substantial protection to NPS units.
B . Section 522(c)— Areas Designated Unsuitable Through 
Petition
Section 522(c) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1272(c), grants any person 
"having an interest which is or may be adversely affected . . . 
the right to petition the regulatory authority to have an area 
designated as unsuitable for surface coal mining operations 
• • • •" Section 522(a) of SMCRA sets out the criteria under
which such a designation is made, including a finding that mining 
operations will "affect fragile or historic lands in which such 
operations could result in significant damage to important 
historic, cultural, scientific, and esthetic values and natural 
systems." 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(B). An unsuitability designa­
tion may be made by the Secretary for lands either inside or 
outside the boundaries of NPS units, and excessive levels of 
fugitive emissions could form the basis for such a designation.
To this date, the only unsuitability petition submitted under 
section 522(c) that has raised the issue of air-quality impacts 
on an NPS unit concerned Bryce Canyon National Park in southern
!/ Either a State under an approved regulatory program, or the 
Secretary.
Utah, In the d©oiynation process former Secretary of the 
Interior Andrus considered the impact of fugitive dust, but 
concluded that the levels expected to result from a proposed 
mining operation in the Alton Coal Field would not have an 
adverse effect on the park. However, the Secretary did conclude 
that other aspects of the mining operation (including noise and 
unsightliness) would adversely affect the park, and accordingly 
determined that the area involved was unsuitable for mining.
That decision was upheld by the United States District Court in 
Utah Intern, v. Dept, of Interior of the U.S., 553 F. Supp. 872 
(D. Utah 1982) .
C . Section 515(b )(4)--Performance Standard
Section 515(b)(4) of SMCRA, which applies to all surface coal 
mining and reclamation operations, contains a performance 
standard that expressly addresses air pollution. It requires 
such operations, at a minimum, to
stabilize and protect all surface areas 
including spoil piles affected by the 
surface coal mining and reclamation to 
effectively control erosion and attendant 
air and water pollution.
30 U.S.C. 1265(b)(4), (emphasis added)..
The regulations at 30 CFR 816.95(a) and 817.95(a), which imple­
ment section 515(b)(4), have been interpreted by the Secretary to 
regulate air pollution attendant to erosion. This interpretation 
was upheld by the district court in In re: Permanent Surface
Mining Regulatior ’ tion II, No. 79-1144, slip op. at 34
It now is recognized that a substantial portion of the air pollu­
tion at surface coal mines results from erosion. EPA has 
indicated that a major source of emissions from surface coal 
mines is the road dust generated by vehicles traveling on mine 
roads. The full extent of the Secretary's authority to regulate 
air pollution attendant to erosion has not yet been tested, but 
it is likely to include the regulation of road dust.
V  The dist rict court ruling currently is on appeal by the 
National Wildlife Federation (NWF), National Wildlife Federation 
v. Donald P. Hodel, No. 84-5743 (D.C. Cir.). The NWF asserts 
that § 515(b)(4) confers upon the Secretary not only this 
authority to regulate air pollution attendant to erosion, but 
also much broader authority to regulate any fugitive dust 
emissions from surface coal mining operations. If the court of 
appeals accepts the interpretation of the NWF, then the Secretary 
will have even broader authority to regulate fugitive dust.
(D .D.C. July 6
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• Under 30 CFR 780.15 and 784.26, mina operators must submit air 
pollution control plans as part of their permit applications to 
demonstrate how they will meet the performance standard of 
section 515(b)(4).
D • Section 515(b)(17)
The Secretary has broad authority to regulate mine roads to 
prevent erosion to road surfaces and to minimize damage from mine 
roads to public property such as NPS units, which includes damage 
resulting from fugitive emissions. Section 515(b)(17) of SMCRA, 
30 U.S.C. 1265(b)(17), requires that a surface mine operation
insure that the construction, maintenance, 
and postmining conditions of access roads 
into and across the site of operations will 
control or prevent erosion and • . • damage 
to . . . public . . . property.
Under this section the Secretary may require a mine operator to 
take steps, such as watering or chemical stabilization, to 
control or prevent erosion from roads, which indirectly, but 
necessarily, will result in corresponding reductions in fugitive 
emissions. And to the extent it can be shown that fugitive 
emissions from a road may damage public property such as an NPS 
unit, this section gives the Secretary broad authority to require
that the operator control or prevent the damage.
/
E . Section 508(a)(9)
Section 508(a)(9) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1258(a)(9), requires that 
each reclamation plan submitted as part of a permit application, 
state the "steps to be taken to comply with applicable air and 
water quality laws and regulations . . . ." Thus, at the permit­
ting stage SMCRA requires applicants to demonstrate how they will 
deal with impacts to air quality. This provision insures that 
the regulatory authority will have adequate information to assess 
such impacts, and complements the enforcement mechanisms 
available under the other applicable laws and regulations.
Ill. National Park Service Organic Act
The National Park Service Organic Act (the Organic Act),
16 U.S.C. 1 et seg. , includes authority for the protection of NPS 
units from impacts to air quality and related values. Section 1 
of the Organic Act provides that the National Park Service
shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal 
areas known as national parks, monuments, and 
reservations . . .  by such means and measures as 
conform to the fundamental purpose of said parks, 
monuments and reservations, which purpose is to 
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for
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•the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by 
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future generations.
16 U.S.C. 1. Section 3 of the Organic Act directs the Secretary 
of the Interior to "make and publish such rules and regulations 
as he may deem necessary or proper for the use and management" of 
such areas. 16 U.S.C. 3.
The protection the Organic Act provides to NPS units from 
activities occurring within their boundaries is clear, including 
any impacts that result from the operation of surface coal mines. 
However, the NPS would have to adopt regulations to accomplish 
this objective.
The Organic Act was enacted pursuant to the Property Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress "to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory 
or other Property belonging to the United States . . . ." U.S.
Const. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Two early U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions have upheld the authority of the Congress under the 
Property Clause to regulate activity occurring on non-Federal 
property. See: Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897)
(upholding Federal statute construed to prohibit fences on 
private land which had the effect of enclosing Federal lands); 
and United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927) (upholding 
Federal statute construed to prohibit the building of fires on 
private land near Federal land without later extinguishing them). 
More recently, while acknowledging that "regulations under the 
Property Clause may have some effect on private lands not 
otherwise under federal control, Camfield v. United States, 167 
U.S. 518 (1897)," the Court declined to define the extent of this 
congressional regulatory power in a context that did not demand 
such definition. See: Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546
( 1976) .
Conclusion
As described above, the Secretary of the Interior has consider­
able authority to protect NPS units from potential fugitive 
emissions from surface coal mines. While the listing of surface 
coal mines as "major" sources of fugitive emissions, which would 
subject them to new source review permitting requirements, may 
provide additional protection to NPS units, it appears that the 
Secretary has adequate legal authority to address this problem in 
a balanced and reasonable manner.
APPENDIX 4
Head of a bronze statue, "The Hiker," honoring soldiers of the Spanish-American War. One of 50 such statues in the U.S., this one, erected in Allentown, 
PA, in 1937, has suffered pitting on the face and streaking on the hat due to air pollution.
POLICY A N D  REGULATIONS
The Clean Air Act and National Parks
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401, et. 
seq., augments the fundamental resource 
protection responsibilities of the National 
Park Service Organic Act with respect to 
the air quality and related values of park 
areas. Together, these authorities form the 
basis for the National Park Service's general 
policy of promoting and pursuing measures 
to safeguard the resources and values of 
units of the National Park System from the 
adverse impacts of air pollution.
The goal of the Clean Air Act (Act) is 
safe and acceptable ambient air quality 
through the attainment and maintenance of 
national ambient air quality standards. The 
'primary'' standards are to protect the 
public health "with an adequate margin of 
safety," and the "secondary'' standards are 
to protect the national “welfare"—defined 
to include the types of resources and values 
found in park areas—from all "known or 
anticipated adverse effects." These primary 
and secondary standards are air pollutant 
concentration levels set on the basis of 
scientific "criteria documents." The En­
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
set national ambient air quality standards 
for six widespread pollutants: sulfur diox­
ide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, 
ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead. State
and local governments may set additional, 
and more stringent, standards.
At any time, a particular area may be 
"cleaner" or "dirtier" than the standards for 
these pollutants. The Act supplements its 
nationwide goal of attaining and maintain­
ing these standards with specific goals for 
these "clean" and "dirty" areas. For the 
clean areas of the country, the Act seeks to 
"prevent the significant deterioration" 
(PSD) of the air quality, particularly in 
areas of special natural, recreational, 
scenic, or historic value. For the "dirty" or 
"nonattainment" areas of the country, the 
Act demands that "reasonable further pro­
gress" be made toward the attainment and 
maintenance of the primary and secondary 
standards.
In pursuit of these standards as well as 
the PSD and nonattainment goals, the Act 
imposes various performance and emission 
restrictions on individual sources. The Act 
uses the State Implementation Plan process 
as the measns to implement and enforce its 
goals and source restrictions.
The PSD title of the Act deserves par­
ticular discussion as a prime authority for 
protecting the resources of parks. In certain 
respects, Part C is a resource protection
statute. One of its purposes is "to preserve, 
protect, and enhance the air quality in na­
tional parks, national wilderness areas, na­
tional monuments, national seashores, and 
other areas of special national or regional 
natural, recreational, scenic, or historic 
value." PSD addresses resource protection 
through the establishment of ceilings on ad­
ditional amounts of air pollution over 
baseline levels in clean air areas, the protec­
tion of the air quality related values of cer­
tain special areas, and additional protection 
for the visibility value of certain special 
areas.
More specifically, Part C reflects Con­
gress' judgment that, among the clean air 
regions of the country, certain areas—the 
"class I" areas—deserve the highest level of 
air quality protection under the Act. Con­
gress designated 158 areas as class I areas, 
including national parks over 6,000 acres 
and national wilderness areas over 5,000 
acres, in existence on August 7, 1977.
In these class I areas, once "baseline" is 
triggered by submission of the first permit 
application from a major new source, Part 
C allows only the smallest "increment" of 
certain pollutants—to date, only sulfur 
dioxide and particulate matter—to be add-
ed to the air. In addition to these increment 
ceilings, PSD also establishes a site-specific 
resource test, known as the ’ adverse im­
pact" test, to determine whether emissions 
from major new sources will cause an 
"adverse impact" on the air quality related 
values" of the class I area. In the case of a 
major new source (or expansion), the 
adverse impact test works as follows:
• If the Federal Land Manager determines, 
and convinces the permitting authority, 
that the new source will adversely impact 
the class I area's resources—even though 
the new source s emissions will not con­
tribute to an increment violation—a 
"PSD permit" shall not be issued.
• If the Federal Land Manager certifies that 
the new source will not adversely impact 
the class I area s resources—even though 
the new source's emissions will con­
tribute to an increment violation—the 
permitting authority may issue a "PSD 
permit."
The adverse impact test imposes an "af­
firmative responsibility" on the Federal 
Land Manager "to protect the air quality 
related issues (including visibility)" of class 
I areas, and, as the Senate committee 
wrote, "(i)n the case of doubt, . . . [to] err 
on the side of protecting the air quality 
related values for future generations." "Air 
quality related values" include all values of 
an area dependent upon and affected by air 
quality, such as scenic, cultural, biological, 
and recreational resources, as well as 
visibility itself. The current working defini­
tion of "adverse impact" is any impact that:
• Diminishes the area's national signifi­
cance, and/or
• Impairs the structure and functioning of 
ecosystems, and/or
• Impairs the quality of the visitor ex­
perience.
In addition to increment ceilings and the 
adverse impact test, Congress enacted one 
more resource protection measure for class 
I areas, namely, "visibility protection" for 
the 156 (of 158) statutory class I areas where 
visibility is an "important value." In Part C 
of the Act, "Congress . . . declares as a na­
tional goal the prevention of any future, 
and the remedying of any existing, impair­
ment of visibility in mandatory class I 
federal areas which impairment results from 
manmade air pollution." In this provision, 
Congress expressed the national desire to 
preserve, for its own sake, the ability to see 
long distances, entire panoramas, and 
specific features in the statutory class I 
areas. EPA is still developing the regulatory 
program to assure "reasonable progress" 
toward the national visibility goal. EPA has 
already issued regulations concerning new 
source review and visibility monitoring re­
quirements, and is now working on regula­
tions concerning "best available retrofit 
technology" for major existing sources that 
impair visibility in statutory class 1 areas as 
well as "long-term (10-15 year) strategies" 
for moving toward the national visibility 
goal. To date, EPA's rulemaking proposals 
have addressed only "plume blight" and
other visibility impairment "reasonably at­
tributable" to a specific source or sources. 
EPA has not yet proposed regulations to 
address visibility impairment from 
"regional haze."
As the above discussion demonstrates, 
the Act creates several opportunities and 
tools for protecting the resources and 
values of class 1 areas. New pollution after 
baseline in class I areas is generally limited 
to the small class I increment, the Federal 
Land Manager must determine whether ma­
jor new sources will adversely impact the 
areas, and measures must be developed to 
protect the visibility of class I areas from 
manmade pollution impairment. The States 
must develop their PSD plans with Federal 
Land Manager consultation and a public 
hearing. Major new sources must undergo 
an equally public permit review, involving 
air quality monitoring; analysis of resource 
impacts; application of "best available con­
trol technology;" and effective emission 
ceilings based on the class I increment, na­
tional ambient standards, adverse impacts 
threshold, or possibly visibility impairment 
threshold, whichever is the lowest. Existing 
sources may be regulated to protect visibili­
ty or to remedy a violation of an increment, 
national ambient standard, or arguably 
class I resource protection.
Part C's concern for resource protection, 
however, is not limited to class I areas. 
Congress designated all other clean air 
regions of the country "class II." Congress 
further prohibited redesignation not only of 
statutory class I areas to any other 
classification, but also of certain class II 
areas to the "dirtier" class III classification. 
These so-called class II "floor" areas include 
the following areas when greater than ten 
thousand acres: national monuments, na­
tional primitive areas, national preserves, 
national recreation areas, national wild and 
scenic rivers, national wildlife refuges, na­
tional lakeshores and seashores; as well as 
national parks and wilderness areas 
established since August 7, 1977. Class II in­
crement ceilings on additional pollution 
over baseline concentrations allow for 
moderate development in class II areas. 
Class II increments constitute an absolute 
ceiling on additional pollution in these 
areas, because Congress did not quality the 
class II increment with an adverse impact 
test.
Although the Act does not create as 
many resource protection tools for class II 
areas as for class I areas, it nevertheless 
creates opportunities. The Federal Land 
Manager can participate in State Implemen­
tation Plan proceedings, new source 
reviews, and other federal, State, and local 
activities that potentially affect the air 
quality of their areas. As appropriate, the 
land manager can undertake or encourage 
efforts to redesignate the area to class I. 
Also, for units of the National Park 
System, the land manager can turn to the 
Organic Act for protection of park pur­
poses and values from adverse air pollution 
impacts.
At this time, there are no "class III" areas. 
States or Indian governing bodies have the 
authority to redesignate to class III any 
clean air area except a statutory class I or 
class II "floor" area. Class III designation 
could allow for substantial air pollution in­
creases over baseline in the area. The 
redesignation process itself, as well as 
subsequent new source reviews, provide 
opportunities for land managers to have 
their air quality concerns considered.
For parks that are in, or affected by, the 
"dirty regions" of the country where the na­
tional ambient air quality standards have 
not yet been met,, the PSD provisions do 
not apply. Instead, the "nonattainment" re­
quirements apply. As with class II and III 
areas, the Act does not establish an explicit 
role (other than consultation) for the land 
manager, but it does require public pro­
ceedings at various times. For example, the 
State must hold a public hearing prior to 
promulgating a nonattainment implementa­
tion plan, which is a plan for attaining all 
national ambient air quality standards "as 
expeditiously as practicable," most primary 
standards by 1982, and primary standards 
for ozone and carb<?n monoxide by 1987. 
The nonattainment plan must demonstrate 
"reasonable further progress" toward the 
national ambient standards in the interim; 
provide for reasonable available control 
technology on sources in the area; analyze 
effects on air quality, welfare, health, socie­
ty, and economics; and require a public 
hearing prior to issuing a permit for a new 
source. To obtain a permit, new sources in 
urban areas must secure from other 
facilities "emission offsets" greater than the 
new source's proposed emissions; in addi­
tion, a new source's control technology 
must comply with the "lowest achievable 
emission rate" for such a source.
As a final word about the Clean Air Act, 
the above discussion suggests many provi­
sions that, directly or indirectly, can ad­
dress many air quality concerns in parks. 
However, the Act—at least as currently in­
terpreted or implemented—does not ad­
dress all such resource protection concerns. 
For example, the Act often does not deal ef­
fectively with the following concerns:
• The individual and cumulative air quali­
ty impacts of sources not subject to PSD 
permit requirements, such as "minor" 
sources, sources located in nonattain­
ment areas, existing sources, and sources 
located in foreign countries;
• Regional loadings of air pollutants; and
• Long-range transport of air pollutants.
Despite these problems, the Act provides 
several effective approaches to park 
resource protection. Essential to making the 
existing statutory authority work for the 
protection of the resources, however, is the 
gathering and development of the relevant 
scientific and technical information on 
which the legal system depends.
Molly Ross 
Air Quality Division 
Washington, D.C.
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D icna ra  P 'e a r a/a ro n a i Se'V'Ce
You ease your station wagon into the parking lot alongside the Grand 
Canyon. You've driven vour family two 
thousand miles to see one of the eight 
wonders of the world. The kids 
scramble to be the first to drop a coin 
into the viewing scope on the canyon's 
rim. They look down at the distant 
bottom of the great gorge, then across to 
the other side. Do they see a 
magnificent and dramatic work of 
nature? Of course they often do. But on 
occasion they may see murk and haze, 
the product of industries, traffic, and 
other sources of airborne pollutants that 
may have travelled hundreds of miles 
from southern California or from the 
copper smelters of southwestern 
Arizona.
Visible air pollution in the form of 
smoke plumes, brown clouds, and gray 
and white haze is associated in most
people’s minds with urban and 
industrial areas. People in Los Angeles 
know there are days when you can't see 
the street from the tower room atop City 
Hall. Denver residents know there are 
many days when industrial and 
automotive air pollution blocks the 
Rocky Mountains from the view of 
drivers on the highway going past 
Denver to the airport. And Washington. 
DC. commuters have driven into town 
in the morning without being able to see 
the Washington Monument through a 
summer's smog.
These same people might not expect 
to have similar visibility problems in 
our national parks, especially in parks 
in isolated reaches of this countrv.
But. as the National Park Serv.ee told 
a Congressional subcomittee last May. 
"even in remote areas such as Grand 
Canyon National Park, visitors 
sometimes cannot see the opposite 
canyon rim or the canyon depths 
because of poor visibility. At Yosemite 
National Park, smoke from fires
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sometime  ̂ obscures the view of the 
weil-known massive cliffs and domes.
In Shenandoah National Park, the Blue 
Ridge' otten appears an unnatural white, 
gray, or brown, and in the Great Smoky 
Mountains National Park, the natural 
haze is usually overwhelmed by 
man-made haze."
The haze-forming particles and gases 
usually enter the air from industrial and 
urban areas. The pollutants either 
absorb or scatter the light, creating 
uniform or lavered hazes and plumes 
that obscure or discolor the landscape 
and limit what the viewer can see. A 
uniform haze is like smog—it impair̂  
visibility in all directions L<i\ered haze 
appears as a discolored band across the 
scene, with a noticeable boundary 
between itself and the background.
Continued to next page
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"Visibility pollution" is one ot the 
pollution problems that concern the 
Department of the Interior and EPA. 
Since the National Park Service was 
established in 1916. the Secretary of 
Interior’s mandate has been to preserve 
and protect the scenery and the natural 
and historic resources of its lands for 
the enjoyment of present and future 
generations.
In response to this mandate and 
additional goals and requirements of the 
1977 Clean Air Act amendments, the 
National Park Service (NPS) conducts 
an extensive research and monitoring 
program to determine the impact of air 
pollution on visibility of national parks, 
monuments, and wilderness areas. The 
NPS also works with the EPA and 
numerous states to develop regulations 
that protect visibility.
In Shenandoah Xational Park, 
the “Blue Ridge" often 
appears an unnatural white, 
gray, or brown.
To determine the seriousness of the 
visibility pollution problem in the 
national parks. NPS currently monitors 
visibility at more than 30 sites from the 
Olympic peninsula on the northwest 
Pacific Coast to the Florida Everglades, 
and from Death Valley. CA. to Acadia 
National Park on the rocky Maine coast. 
NPS monitors use color photography, 
teleradiometry. and the collection and 
analysis of particles in the air.
The color photography documents the 
important elements of the scene and 
how they vary with changing air 
pollution levels, weather conditions, 
and sunlight. Teleradiometry uses a 
special telescope to measure the 
contrast between the sky in the 
background and dark landscape features 
so that changes in contrast caused by 
pollution or climatic change can be 
recorded.
Together, the photography and 
teleradiometry can be used to establish 
standard visual ranges—the distance
from an observer at which a large dark 
object such as a forested mountain 
would just disappear against the 
horizon. Collecting and analyzing small 
particles in the air gives the NPS 
scientists a wealth of information on the 
particles' possible origin and their effect 
on visibility.
The focus is on very fine particles 
(those smaller than 2.5 micrometers in 
diameter—one tenth the diameter of a 
human hair) which generally cause most 
of the visibility problems.
What has this NPS monitoring found 
out?
•  More than 90 percent of the time, 
man-made pollution affected scenic 
views to some degree at all NPS 
monitoring sites.
•  Best average visibility is in northern • 
Nevada. Utah, and southern Idaho. The 
area that includes Grand Canyon. Brvce 
Canyon, and Canyonlands National 
Parks is next best.
•  The lowest visual range in the west is 
in the coastal areas of California and 
Washington.
•  The very worst visibility recorded by 
NPS is in the eastern United States, 
where there are higher relative humidity 
and background air pollution levels. In 
the summer of 1983, for instance, the 
median visibility range at the 
Shenandoah National Park in Virginia 
was 19 kilometers, as compared to 100 
to 200 kilometers for most western 
parks.
•  Visibility is generally best in the 
winter and worst in the summer.
The NPS research and monitoring 
effort has provided much evidence to 
establish particulates as the maior 
contributor to visibility impairment in 
the parks. The very fine particles are 
especially adept at scattering light and 
producing visibility impairment, much 
more so than big particles which 
actually form a larger percentage of the 
pollution mass. This is particularly true 
for sulfates, which are the largest single 
fraction of the total collected fine 
particle mass.
What's more, sulfates are optically 
active particles that are very efficient at 
scattering light and reducing visibility.
These particles are the end pro.iuct oi 
atmospheric chemical transtormatioa 
gaseous sulfur dioxide that comes tror 
such air pollution sources as power 
plants, smelters, refineries, and oil am 
gas fields.
How pervasive are sulfate particles 
visibility impairers? NPS found them • 
be the number one villain everywhere 
except in the northwest, where carbon 
particles took the lead. In the Coloradi 
Plateau, where Grand and Bryce 
Canyons are located, sulfate particles 
were responsible for 40 to 65 percent c 
the visibility impairment and in the 
Shenandoah National Park for over 70 
percent.
In the Southwest, windblown dust, 
emissions from construction activities, 
and traffic on unpaved roads 
contributed 10 to 30 percent of the 
visibility reduction, while fine-particle 
carbons and nitrates accounted for 
another 20 percent.
NPS scientists are beginning to 
believe that volatile aerosols—small 
airborne particles that quickly evaporat 
and are difficult for currently used 
particulate samplers to collect—mav bt 
responsible for a significant share of the 
visibility problem. One special study at 
Grand Canyon National Park suggests 
that aerosols more volatile than 
ammonium sulfate may account for 30 
to 40 percent of the visibility reduction 
there.
Because sulfates are such an 
important bad actor in terms of 
visibility pollution. NPS has conducted 
extensive analyses to determine where 
the sulfate aerosols measured at the 
monitoring stations come from. The 
agency's scientists developed a 
technique called "back traiectorv 
residence time analysis" to estimate the 
probable paths that sulfur particles 
travel from the original pollution source 
to the park.
Thev found, for example, that air 
masses bringing high sulfur 
concentrations to Grand Canyon come 
mostlv from urban southern Calitorn.a 
Under different climatic conditions the 
particle-laden air came from the copper 
smelter regions of southern Arizona n 
davs when the particle concentrations
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were low and the air clean, the clean air 
mass was more likely to have come 
from the north. Similar traiectorv 
analyses were performed in a number of 
parks and monuments in the West; 
these results, too. suggested that sulfur 
emissions from distant urban and 
industrial source areas contributed to 
the reduced visibility at those locations.
In the 1977 amendments to the Clean 
j Air Act. the Congress required
development of regulations to protect 
visibility in national parks and
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wilderness areas. NPS has been working 
with EPA and state air pollution 
agencies to reach this national visibility 
goal, which includes both remedying 
existing visibility impairment caused by 
man-made air pollution and preventing 
future problems. The amendments 
directed EPA to develop regulations to 
assure reasonable progress toward 
meeting the national goal and to provide 
the states with guidelines for 
implementing visibility protection 
programs through State Implementation 
Plans.
The regulatory program mandates 
EPA or the states with federally 
approved visibility programs to:
•  Evaluate and control new sources of 
air pollution to prevent future visibility 
impairment in national parks and 
wilderness areas.
•  Evaluate and control significant 
visibility impairment in such areas that 
can be traced to specific sources of air 
pollution.
•  Adopt and implement long-term 
strategies for making reasonable 
progress toward the national visibility 
goal.
The program also gives states the 
discretion to extend the visibility 
protection to views of specific 
landmarks or scenic panoramas that can 
be seen from within a national park but 
which are outside its boundaries. Such 
views are called "integral vistas. The 
states will determine which of these 
scenic attractions need protection, and 
how much. NPS is working with the 
states to help them incorporate 
consideration of scenic park features in 
their rulemaking and protective actions.
Although administrative and judicial 
review actions delayed implementation 
of visibility actions. EPA published in 
July 1985 a federal approach to 
monitoring visibility for 19 states and a 
plan for determining new sources of 
parkland pollution in 16 states. Other 
states submitted State Implementation 
Plans for EPA review. Because EPA has 
found 32 states deficient in some
aspects of the visibility rules, the 
Agency intends later this year to 
propose federal plans to remedv those 
deficiencies.
The federal monitoring effort involves 
both EPA and federal land managers in 
a cooperative network. A technical 
steering committee which includes 
members of the associated agencies is 
implementing the monitoring program 
and is now in the process of selecting 
the methods and locations to be used.
In the original 1980 regulations, the 
EPA focused on visibility impairment 
caused by single sources because ot 
scientific and technical limitations in 
identifying sources of widespread 
regional haze or complex urban plumes. 
EPA committed itself to dealing with 
these issues in future rulemakings.
In 1984, EPA's Deputy Administrator 
established an Interagency Task Force to 
look at the development of strategies for 
addressing visibility problems created 
by pollution-derived haze, to study the 
links between haze and such problems 
as acid deposition and fine particulates, 
and to recommend a five to ten year 
program to deal with haze. In 1985. the 
Task Force reported its findings and 
recommendations in the areas of 
research needs, policy analyses, and 
interim regulatory and legislative 
considerations. The recommendations 
have resulted in additional research 
commitments and are being considered 
in developing federal plans.
In the few years since Congress 
amended the Clean Air Act to include 
the problem of visibility degradation, 
the Park Service visibility and research 
monitoring program has done a great 
deal to promote a better understanding 
ot the problem. This program is 
providing the necessary basis for 
informed and effective decisions on 
visibility protection issues, regulation 
development, and the ultimate success 
ot National Park Service efforts to 
manage and preserve the parks for 
present and future generations who 
want to enioy the beauty and inspiration 
that comes from sharing nature s 
wonders. -
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